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ABSTRACT
Since its creation in 2003, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has used increasingly aggressive tactics to enforce U.S.
immigration law. One of ICE's most prominent enforcement initiatives is
its practice of raiding the homes of immigrants. Accounts of home raids
from victims all over the country reveal a pattern of practice that differs
widely from ICE's official statements regarding raids. This paper
establishes that although immigration officials are governed by the Fourth
Amendment when conducting home raids, ICE's agents nonetheless
regularly violate the Constitution when carrying out home raids.
Additionally, this paper argues that the number and nature of these
constitutional violations, combined with the social costs of the raids,
present a compelling case for policy change. The paper concludes with a
series of policy proposals that would rectify the profound invasions of
privacy and degrading treatment many immigrants in this country are
currently experiencing.
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INTRODUCTION
At 4:30 a.m. on January 29, 2008, Maria Argueta awoke to loud
banging on the windows and doors of her home in North Bergen, New
Jersey.2 She was scared that people were trying to break in and did not
open the door.3 The basement tenants in her building went out to
investigate.4 The individuals knocking on the house were visibly armed
and said they were police officers looking for a male criminal.5 The
2. First Amended Complaint J 57, Argueta v. ICE, 2009 WL 1307236 (D.N.J. May 7,




5. Id. TT 58,60.
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
THE ICE STORMIN U.S. HOMES
tenants phoned their landlord, Ms. Argueta's brother, and gave the phone
to one of the purported police officers who repeated this story.6 Ms.
Argueta's brother called her and told her that police officers needed to
enter her apartment as part of their search for a male criminal.7 Based on
this information, Ms. Argueta opened her door.8
After entering Ms. Argueta's apartment, the agents again identified
themselves as police and asked her if she knew a particular man.9 She told
them no.1" Even though Ms. Argueta had lived in her apartment for seven
years, and no man had lived there during that time, the agents searched
her entire apartment.1' Ms. Argueta was not allowed to change or use the
bathroom outside the presence of an agent. 2 Three agents remained
stationed in front of the door to her apartment. One of the agents asked
her about her immigration status. 3 Ms. Argueta told them that she had
received Temporary Protection Status (TPS) and showed them
documentation proving her status. 4 The agents told Ms. Argueta that she
would not be receiving a new TPS card that year and arrested her without
verifying her status, despite the fact that TPS status information is easily
accessible in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service database.15 She
was taken to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 6 facility in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, and then transferred twice.17 Ms. Argueta was not
given food or water for over twenty-four hours and was detained for nearly
thirty-six hours before being released. 8 ICE agents confiscated her
passport and jewelry, which were never returned to her. 9
Nelly Amaya awoke in her Suffolk County, New York, home between
6. Id. 1 59.
7. Id.






14. Id I 65-66.
15. Id. I 66-67.
16. ICE was formed in March 2003 when the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) was created and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was reorganized
within DHS. Before March 2003, the INS was responsible for enforcing immigration laws
as well as processing applications for immigration benefits. Those two functions have been
separated into different departments within DHS: (1) ICE; and (2) the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service, which is responsible for adjudicating immigration applications. See
Dep't of Homeland Sec., History: Who Became Part of the Department?, http://
www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited July 8, 2009) (detailing agency
name changes and functions in 2003).
17. Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, 91$ 72-73.
18. Id. 74.
19. Id. IT 68,76.
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4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on the morning of February 20, 2007, to find ICE agents
in her bedroom.2 ° The agents had gained entry by kicking open the door
to her home.21 When she awoke, Ms. Amaya observed several men
blocking the door to her bedroom. 22 One of the agents shone a flashlight
in her eyes and started asking about her brother-in-law. 3 The agents
ordered her into the living room. 24 Ms. Amaya had been wearing only a t-
shirt and underwear, and she was just able to put on pajama pants and a
sweatshirt as one of the agents pulled her by the arm to the living room.25
Ms. Amaya asked the men who they were, but her questions were to no
avail.26 Ms. Amaya also asked to see a warrant, but the officers did not
show her one. 7 Ms. Amaya had been using a sling because of an arm
injury, but ICE agents twisted her arm to frisk her and handcuffed her
nonetheless, causing her injured arm to turn purple and swell.2 ' After
being arrested, she was eventually taken to the ICE processing station in
downtown New York. 9 She was fingerprinted and questioned by another
ICE officer.3" This officer asked Ms. Amaya, "Why did they take you in?
You have a clean record," and later remarked, "You shouldn't have asked
for a warrant."'" After being detained for ten hours, Ms. Amaya was
released in only her pajamas and sweatshirt, without treatment for her
injury, money, or a way to travel the several hours back to her home.32 She
eventually succeeded in convincing a taxi driver to bring her to the house
of her friend in Queens who could pay the fare and help her get home.33
What happened to Ms. Argueta and Ms. Amaya is emblematic of the
experience of thousands of individuals throughout the United States
subjected to ICE's growing practice of home raids. Unless the Obama
Administration adopts the policy changes proposed in this paper, more
and more families in the United States are likely to wake in the middle of
the night to ICE agents banging at their doors, forcing their way inside,
searching their homes, and questioning them against their will and in
20. Amended Class Action Complaint 17, 148-49, 156, Aguilar v. ICE, 255 F.R.D.




23. Id TT 147, 155,158.
24. Id 159.
25. Id 157, 160.
26. Id 158.
27. Id 162.
28. Id. I 170-75.
29. Id 179.
30. Id 180.
31. Id. TT 181-82.
32. Id. $T[ 185-86.
33. Id T 186.
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violation of their rights.34
Since ICE's formation in 2003, the government has dramatically
expanded its interior immigration enforcement efforts." ICE created
Fugitive Operations Teams 36 to arrest people the agency refers to as
"fugitive aliens"-individuals who have not left the United States after
receiving a final order of removal or who were issued a notice to appear at
an ICE Detention and Removal Office but missed their scheduled
hearing.37 It is important to note that the existence of a removal order
does not necessarily mean that the individual subject to that order is aware
of the order and is a "fugitive" in the conventional sense of the word.38
Removal orders can be issued in absentia, and there is a formal process for
challenging these orders based on the government's failure to give proper
notice of the proceeding.39 Individuals subject to a removal order issued in
34. As of the time of publication, the Obama Administration was continuing to
conduct home raids and defend ICE agents' conduct in the course of the raids. See Nina
Bernstein, Report Says Immigration Agents Broke Laws and Agency Rules in Home
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A20; Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants
Remains Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A14.
35. ICE, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations (2008),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheetsINFOP FS.pdf [hereinafter ICE Fugitive
Operations Fact Sheet]. See also ICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENDGAME:
OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN 2003-2012, at 4-4 (2003) ("DRO
Goal One" is to achieve "a 100% rate of removal of all removable aliens."), available at
http://www.thenyic.org/images/uploads/ICE-Endgame-Strategic 
-Plan.pdf. This strategy
raises serious questions as to its feasibility and sensibility. There are an estimated twelve
million people in the United States who have committed a removable offense or are
without status and therefore removable, and former Assistant Secretary Myers estimated
the cost of removing all of these individuals at nearly $100 billion, not including the costs of
locating all twelve million individuals. See Mike M. Ahlers, ICE.- Tab to Remove Illegal
Residents Would Approach $100 Billion, CNN.COM, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/
2007/US/09/12/deportation.cost/index.html.
36. A typical Fugitive Operations Team is comprised of seven members: four
Deportation Officers who are primarily responsible for identifying, locating, and
apprehending fugitive aliens; an Immigration Enforcement Agent who assists in arresting
individuals and transporting them to detention and processing centers; one supervisor; and
one assistant. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-07-34, AN
ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT'S FUGITIVE
OPERATIONS TEAMS 6 (2007) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-34_MarO7.pdf. Initially, only Deportation Officers who had
achieved a relatively high level of experience (GS-12) were included on the teams, but due
to the expansion of the teams and the lack of applicants at that level, teams now include
less experienced officers. Id. at 7.
37. Letter from Michael Chertoff, Dir. of Homeland Sec., to Christopher J. Dodd, U.S.
Senator (June 14, 2007) [hereinafter Chertoff Letter] (on file with author); ICE Fugitive
Operations Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
38. See generally In re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181, 181 (2001) ("[E]ntry of an in
absentia order of removal is inappropriate where the record reflects that the alien did not
receive, or could not be charged with receiving the Notice to Appear that was served by
certified mail at an address obtained from documents filed with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service several years earlier.").
39. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), (C)(ii) (2006).
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absentia nonetheless fall under ICE's rubric of "fugitive aliens."4
Approximately 100 Fugitive Operations Teams were operating nationally
as of September 2008,41 and ICE estimates that over 96,000 people had
been arrested through this program by the end of September 2008.42
In 2006, ICE launched "Operation Return to Sender,"43 a nationwide
interior enforcement initiative that aims to "eliminate the backlog of ICE
fugitive cases"44-an estimated 560,000 people as of September 2008.4"
With the launch of "Operation Return to Sender," ICE imposed arrest
quotas of 1000 arrests per year on each Fugitive Operations Team.
4 6
Immigration arrests climbed sharply as a result of these policies. In 2008,
ICE reported a nearly twenty-fold increase in the number of annual
immigration arrests since 2003.47  The Obama Administration has
reportedly replaced this arrest quota with a requirement that each Fugitive
Operations Team identifies and targets fifty "fugitive aliens" per month as
well as another 500 "fugitive aliens" each year in operations with other
Fugitive Operations Teams.48 However, the Obama Administration has
not abandoned home raids as an enforcement method,49 and, as a result,
thousands of people living in the United States will continue to experience
severe invasions of privacy and abusive behavior by U.S. officials.
Reports of the way home raids are conducted have provoked criticism
from immigrant communities, their advocates, the media, policymakers,
and the legal community. While officials from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE say their practices conform to the
Fourth Amendment and respect other individual rights, ° numerous
40. See Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
41. ICE Fugitive Operations Fact Sheet, supra note 35, at 2. This represents more
than a twelvefold increase in the number of teams from when the initiative began in 2003.
See id (reporting that when the program was launched, there were only eight fugitive
operations teams nationwide).
42. MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE's FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOPFebO9.pdf.
43. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
44. Id
45. ICE Fugitive Operations Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
46. OIG REPORT, supra note 36, at 8-9.
47. See ICE Fugitive Operations Fact Sheet, supra note 35, at 1 (reporting that there
were approximately 1900 arrests in fiscal year 2003 and approximately 34,000 in fiscal year
2008).
48. N.C. Aizenman, Conflicting Accounts of an ICE Raid in Md, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 2009, at Al.
49. See supra note 34.
50. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 113, In re O-R- (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. filed
Apr. 23, 2008) (testimony of ICE field officer discussing the training ICE agents receive on
the Fourth Amendment) (on file with author); Elizabeth Llorente, Immigration Officials
Say Raids on Illegals Are Within the Law, HACKENSACK REC., Jan. 2, 2008 (including
statement by Scott Weber, ICE field director for its Newark, New Jersey, office: "We all
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challenges have been raised through civil lawsuits51 and evidence
suppression hearings in immigration courts.52 Legal commentators are also
paying increasing attention to the methods used to enforce immigration
laws as these initiatives have expanded and become more aggressive.53
I argue that urgent policy change is needed under the Obama
Administration to alter the current trajectory of immigration enforcement
practices. Home raids may result in the deportation of individuals without
immigration status, but these deportations come at a significant cost.
Accounts of home raids from across the country demonstrate that
individuals are often stripped of their dignity at the hands of state actors
following policies that arguably violate the Constitution. Numerous
elements of ICE's practices result in profound intrusions of privacy and
give rise to several distinct claims under the Fourth Amendment. The
operate under the same Constitution .... Our officers have extensive training in which
they're taught constitutional law, statutory law, and immigration law."); Stephanie Francis
Ward, Illegal Aliens on ICE.: Tougher Immigration Enforcement Tactics Spur Challenges,
A.B.A. J., June 2008 (reporting that Michael Neifach, ICE's principal legal adviser, stated
that agents are trained to obtain consent or produce a lawful search warrant during raids on
private residences); Chertoff Letter, supra note 37 (emphasizing that questioning about
identity and requests for identification do not constitute Fourth Amendment seizures);
Letter from Julie Myers, Assistant Sec'y, ICE, to Christina DeConcini, Dir. of Policy, Nat'l
Immigration Forum (July 6, 2007) [hereinafter Myers Letter] (arguing that home raids are
completed in a manner that respects the rights of those involved), available at http:/!
law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PubliclntGovServ/CSJ/upload/exhibit-d.pdf.
51. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Damages, Arias v. ICE, 2009 WL 2900315 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009) (No. 07-1959)
[hereinafter Arias Complaint]; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2; First Amended
Complaint-Class Action, Mancha exrelMartinez v. ICE, 2009 WL 900800 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
31, 2009) (No. 1:06-CV-2650) [hereinafter Mancha Complaint]; Aguilar Complaint, supra
note 20; Complaint, Daniel T. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Otero, No. 2:07-CV-01044
(D.N.M. filed Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Daniel T Complaint]; Amended Complaint,
Flores-Morales v. George, No. 1:07-CV-0050 (M.D. Tenn. filed July 27, 2007) [hereinafter
Flores-Morales Complaint].
52. See, e.g., In re P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, at 7 (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. June 25,
2008) (on file with author); In re N- (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 23, 2007) (on file
with author); In re M- (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 16, 2007) (on file with author);
Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50; Respondent's Memorandum in Support of
Its Motion to Suppress and Terminate, In re M- (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. filed Oct. 2,
2008) [hereinafter Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-] (on file with author).
53. See, e.g., BESS CHIu, LYNLY EGYES, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & JAYA VASANDANI,
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, CONSTITUTION ON
ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS (2009), available at
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC-ICE-
Home-Raid-Report%20Updated.pdf; Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens" Privacy
Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Cnminal
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis. Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367 (2006); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants'Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L.
REV. 853 (2008); Raquel Aldana, Immigration Raids Lead US. to a Moral, Legal Crisis, LA
PRENSA SAN DIEGO, June 13, 2008.
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likely unconstitutionality of the agency's actions and resulting liability
should be sufficient to prompt changes in policy. However, in addition to
the degradation felt by individuals, including U.S. residents and citizens,
home raids exact a significant social cost that should provoke policy
change. The clamor for enforcement of immigration laws does not justify
aggressive and divisive home raids. Instead, I outline different options for
policymakers in the Obama Administration that would respect the letter
and spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
The first section compares ICE's official policy on home raids as
described by former high-level administrators and in written guidelines
with their actual practice. Evidence from home raids nationwide reveals
widespread patterns of ICE agents detaining people through deception,
intimidation, and physical force rather than through voluntary cooperation
as described by ICE officials. This section also shows that the majority of
those arrested by ICE do not fall under any of the categories that the
Fugitive Operations Teams are supposed to target, suggesting that the
public receives a false picture of these operations' outcomes. As a result,
the impact of the current policy is felt primarily by individuals who may
not be removable and have no criminal history or prior contact with
immigration officials. This group, along with the family members swept up
in the raids, includes U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.
The second section argues that the Fourth Amendment applies to ICE
as it conducts home raids regardless of the legal status of the home's
occupants. Because of the substantial privacy interests at stake, the
administrative nature of immigration law should not lessen the protections
of the Fourth Amendment in the context of home raids. This section also
demonstrates that ICE routinely violates the Fourth Amendment at three
distinct points in the course of conducting home raids: entering the home,
searching the premises, and interrogating the residents. Finally, Section II
examines weaknesses in the Fourth Amendment doctrine that could
prevent victims of home raids from prevailing in their constitutional
claims. It concludes that these doctrinal idiosyncrasies, which might allow
ICE's practices to survive constitutional scrutiny, are not a sound basis for
public policy. Instead, ICE's enforcement practices should be legally
subject and should conform in practice to the core principles of the Fourth
Amendment.
Section III outlines the social costs of the current policy and proposes
changes for the new administration. The broad effects of home raids
provide additional weight to the constitutional arguments for policy
change. Home raids undermine relationships between local police
departments and immigrant communities, making it more difficult to
investigate crimes and provide protection. U.S. citizens, especially those of
Hispanic descent, are regularly swept up in immigration raids. Not only do
some U.S. citizens have to bear the burden of a constitutionally-
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
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problematic enforcement policy, but that burden is also allocated by race.
Further, ICE officials may be willing to accept constitutional violations in
their current practices because there are often no legal consequences for
violations due to the limitations of the exclusionary rule in immigration
proceedings. This "what can we get away with" approach to public policy
undermines the rule of law and erodes the government's credibility.
Section III concludes with several policy recommendations. In light of
the likely constitutional violations and the social costs of these raids,
ultimately, the Obama Administration should stop the raids. The privacy
intrusion is too great, the reliance on bad information is too pervasive, and
the state interest in enforcing administrative immigration law is too low. If
the Obama Administration stops short of prohibiting home raids
altogether, it should put in place safeguards, such as informing residents of
their right to refuse entry or only entering homes after obtaining a
modified judicial arrest warrant, to ensure that individuals' constitutional
rights are protected. It should closely monitor the impact of its new
"target and identify" quotas to make certain they do not lead to the same
dragnet sweeps as were caused by previous arrest quotas. Finally, it should
ensure that ICE follows its own regulations, which recognize the Fourth
Amendment as a constraint on agency action but are often disregarded in
practice.
I.
ICE'S POLICY VERSUS ITS PRACTICE
A. ICE Policy: Statements by Officials Regarding Home Raids
Even the nomenclature of home-based immigration enforcement has
sparked controversy. Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff rejected
the term "raid," stating that it implies an ad hoc approach to immigration
enforcement.54 He asserted instead that Fugitive Operations Teams design
their enforcement efforts based on the following arrest targets, in
descending order of priority: (1) fugitives who are a threat to national
security, (2) fugitives who pose a threat to the community, (3) fugitives
who were convicted of violent crimes, (4) fugitives who have criminal
records, and (5) non-criminal fugitives.
Mr. Chertoff and the former DHS Assistant Secretary in charge of
ICE, Julie Myers, described the general practices employed by agents
conducting home raids in letters responding to public and Congressional
54. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
55. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 38-39 regarding removal orders issued
in absentia.
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criticism of such raids in New Haven, Connecticut.56 First, the Fugitive
Operations Teams identify their targets. Mr. Chertoff stated that the
Fugitive Operations Teams act on "specific intelligence-based data
gathered through law enforcement channels. Once intelligence is gathered
on several fugitives located within the same general vicinity, a Fugitive
Operation Team will develop an operational plan for the swift and safe
arrest of the fugitive aliens in the most fiscally efficient way.
57
Second, the ICE officers must gain access to the residence.
Deportation officers often carry a "Warrant of Deportation/Removal"
(Form 1-205) for the fugitive alien who is purportedly connected to the
address of the house targeted." A Warrant of Deportation/Removal is an
administrative warrant, not a judicially-issued arrest or search warrant
based on probable cause.59 Once an administrative immigration judge has
determined that an individual is removable from the United States, federal
rules require a Warrant of Deportation/Removal to be issued within
fourteen days.' This warrant can be issued by any person with one of
twenty-five different titles in ICE or by their designees.61 In short, a
Warrant of Deportation/Removal is generated pro forma by any one of a
large number of agency officials. It does not authorize entry into
residences or other private areas,62 nor is it usually generated close in time
to a raid on any particular home.63  Because Warrants of
Deportation/Removal do not authorize ICE agents to enter the home of
the person named, ICE officials are adamant that consent is always
obtained before agents enter a residence.' Addressing home raids that
56. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
57. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
58. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 113; Llorente, supra note 50
(including statement by Scott Weber, ICE field director for Newark, New Jersey, office:
"My officers are not involved in sweeps or random searches. We're looking for specific
individuals that we have specific information for and active and valid warrants for their
removal.").
59. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
60. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(1) (2009).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(a)(1) (2009). The Office of Detention and Removal Operations
issues a Warrant of Deportation/Removal once a final order of removal has been issued by
an immigration judge. Id.; Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
62. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 113-14 (describing the
administrative warrants as "knock and talk" warrants because officers must be granted
access into the residence); Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
63. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(1) (2009). Because the federal rule requires a Warrant of
Deportation/Removal to be generated within fourteen days of an order of removal, its
issuance can precede the date of a home raid by months or even years.
64. Declaration of Lawrence Mulvey in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence, In re
M- (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. filed Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Mulvey Declaration] ("In
conversations with representatives of ICE, it was reported to me [Commissioner of Police
for Nassau County] that in all 131 homes they asked for and received consent to enter.")
(on file with the author); Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
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occurred in New Haven on June 6, 2007, Mr. Chertoff stated that ICE
agents never entered a house without consent and added that each team
included a Spanish-speaking officer to ensure that consent was obtained
"knowingly and voluntarily. '" 65
Next, the ICE officers search all rooms of the home and gather all
individuals present in a common area, regardless of whether they reside in
the home or are just visiting.6 ICE officials explained that this action is
required for the safety of the officers67 and is "a common practice
throughout law enforcement. '
ICE officers then request proof of identification from all individuals
present.69 Mr. Chertoff stated that "[q]uestioning as to identity or request
for identification does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure., 71
Additionally, Mr. Chertoff and Ms. Myers asserted that ICE officers have
"the authority to question any person as to their right to enter, reenter,
pass through, or reside in the United States."71 It should be noted that the
statute they cited as the basis for this authority has been interpreted to
require reasonable suspicion on the part of the agents that the person
questioned is not a U.S. citizen." Both Mr. Chertoff and Ms. Myers
acknowledged that "[t]he individual being interviewed must voluntarily
agree to remain during questioning,"73 because detaining an individual
against her will for further questioning requires the officers to have a
reasonable suspicion that the individual "has committed a crime, is an
65. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
66. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 109-10; Chertoff Letter, supra
note 37.
67. Id, See also Nina Bernstein, U.S. Raid on an Immigrant Household Deepens
Anger and Aistrust, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at BI (The article describes a home raid of
Latino U.S. citizens in East Hampton, New York, in which officers were looking for the ex-
husband of the homeowner. The homeowner had an order of protection against her former
husband, and they had been divorced for five years at the time of the raid. Christopher
Shanahan, the Director of Deportation and Removal for ICE in New York, stated: "Due to
officer safety needs, they can look into other areas, to clear rooms.").
68. Myers Letter, supra note 50.
69. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 107.
70. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
71. Id.; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
72. Both letters cite 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) for this proposition. The relevant language
of this statute states: "Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant ... to interrogate
any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006). Courts have interpreted the word "believed" in the
context of the Fourth Amendment and generally require reasonable suspicion that the
individual was a noncitizen before interrogation can occur. See, e.g., Babula v. INS, 665
F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 1981); Ojeda-Vinales v. INS, 523 F.2d 286, 287 (2d Cir. 1975); Au Yi
Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217,223 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
73. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37. See also Myers Letter, supra note 50 (changing the
language to "[a]n individual being interviewed voluntarily agrees to remain during
questioning").
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alien who is unlawfully present, is an alien with status who is either
inadmissible or removable from the United States, or is a nonimmigrant
who is required to provide truthful information to DHS upon demand.
74
Finally, ICE officers may arrest, without a warrant, any individuals
they encounter at the targeted location who they believe are in the United
States illegally and are removable. Mr. Chertoff and Ms. Myers stated
that "[a] warrant is not necessary when arresting someone in the country
illegally., 76 Ms. Myers added, "ICE cannot turn a blind eye to illegal aliens
once encountered., 77
B. ICE Practice: A Divergent Pattern Emerges from Accounts of Raids
Across the Country
Descriptions of home raids from all over the country illustrate a
pattern of practice in which ICE officials rely on deception and
intimidation rather than on the voluntary cooperation of occupants in
conducting home raids. In a typical home raid, between five and twenty-
five ICE agents arrive at a home early in the morning when residents are
usually asleep.78 Agents bang on the door, sometimes claiming to be the
police,79 sometimes identifying themselves as immigration officials," and
74. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50. With respect to
nonimmigrants, both letters cite 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(f), which requires nonimmigrants to
provide "full and truthful disclosure of all information requested by the Service" in order to
maintain their lawful status in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(f) (2009). The "Service"
refers to the INS, the legacy agency of ICE and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS). The immigration section of the Code of Federal Regulations has not
been fully revised since the INS was eliminated and replaced by USCIS and ICE.
75. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
76. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50. Although neither
letter cites statutory authority for this proposition, presumably they are basing these
statements on 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006) ("Any officer or employee of the Service
authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without
warrant... to arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien
so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest .... "). ICE officers must have
probable cause to believe that a person is likely to escape for a warrantless arrest. See
Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 62
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Khan, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186-87 (D. Colo. 2004).
However, admission of unlawful status alone has been found to be sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. Contreras v. United States, 672 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. Myers Letter, supra note 50.
78. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 3; Argueta Complaint,
supra note 2, J1 2, 57, 96-97, 112, 134, 148, 163, 176; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, T
24-26; Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, T 15-31; Flores-Morales Complaint, supra note
51, 22(a).
79. See, e.g., Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, 58, 98, 126; Mancha Complaint,
supra note 51, 26.
80. See, e.g., Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, 42; Aguilar Complaint, supra note
20, $ 227.
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sometimes saying nothing at all.8 Though ICE agents often have a
Warrant of Deportation/Removal for someone who may have been
connected to the address at one time, this information is frequently
outdated. 2 If someone opens the door, the agents generally push their
way into the house.83 Agents are also reported to have kicked in doors or
entered through windows.' Upon entry, agents typically search the
entirety of the home and gather all individuals in a common area,85
sometimes handcuffing people or drawing their guns.86 Agents then
demand identification and proof of immigration status,87 and arrest anyone
who cannot prove her lawful status.' Individuals are transported to a
detention center to be processed. Many report being held at detention
centers for extended periods without food or water.89
C. The Target: Fugitive Aliens or Collateral Arrests
To understand the impact of ICE's home raids, it is important to
examine who is arrested. ICE's rhetoric includes references to "criminal
aliens," "fugitive aliens," and "gang associates."9  ICE has historically
81. See, e.g., Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, T 78; Mancha Complaint, supra note
51, 61; AguilarComplaint, supra note 20, 123, 211.
82. See OIG REPORT, supra note 36, at 15 (characterizing the majority of the
information in the database used by the Fugitive Operations Teams to conduct home raids
as "inaccurate" or "incomplete"); Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau
Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1 (reporting Nassau County Police
Commissioner Lawrence Mulvey's observation that, after ICE agents repeatedly declined
offers to check the addresses of their list of targets against a local database that is updated
daily, they found only six of their ninety-six targets).
83. See, e.g., Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, T T 80, 99, 115, 127; Aguilar Complaint,
supra note 20, 255.
84. See, e.g., Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 68; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51,
$ 59, 68; AguilarComplaint, supra note 20, $ 193,205, 287.
85. See, e.g., Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, $$ 63, 129, 143; Aguilar Complaint,
supra note 20, 118, 249, 256, 286; Illegal Immigrants Arrested Two Days After ID
Proposal Passes (NBC Connecticut television broadcast, June 6, 2007) (covering raids in
New Haven, Connecticut).
86. See, e.g., Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 72; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2,
IT 84, 151; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, 37; Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20,
248; Llorente, supra note 50; Aaron Nicodemus, Illegal Aliens Arrested in Raid: Feds Nab
15 in Milford, WORCHESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Dec. 9, 2007, available at http://www.
telegram.com/article/20071209/NEWS/712090446/NEWS02.
87. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 109; Argueta
Complaint, supra note 2, 50; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, % 50; Aguilar Complaint,
supra note 20, 266; Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 5.
88. See, e.g., Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 93; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2,
IT 3, 75 (Plaintiff Argueta provided ICE agents with proof of identification and proof of
lawful status but was nonetheless arrested and held in a processing center for thirty-six
hours); Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, 1 165.
89. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 57-58; Argueta
Complaint, supra note 2, 74.
90. See Bernstein, supra note 82 (discussing gang associates); Chertoff Letter, supra
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refused to disclose information about the ratio of arrests of individuals
targeted in the raids to total arrests.91 Documents released in February
2009 as a result of a lawsuit show that forty-six percent of the noncitizens
arrested by ICE from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008 were "collateral"
arrests, not arrests of individuals who fit the five arrest priorities described
by Mr. Chertoff.92 These "collateral" individuals have had no contact with
the criminal justice system and no previous contact with immigration
enforcement. All personal accounts of home raids included in this article
come from people considered "collateral arrests." There were nearly
30,000 collateral arrests made between 2005 and 2008.9"
Reports from individual raids often reflect an even greater proportion
of collateral arrests. In raids in Contra Costa County, California, over the
course of ten days, ICE reported a ratio of five collateral arrests for every
target arrested. 94 A report from Columbus, Ohio, indicated that over fifty-
five percent of those arrested were collateral arrests.95 Approximately
seventy percent of the arrests in raids in Suffolk and Nassau counties in
New York were collateral arrests. 96 Raids in New Haven resulted in a ratio
of approximately six collateral arrests for every arrest of a fugitive alien.97
ICE press releases in New Jersey indicate that as few as one in three
individuals arrested in raids in April 2007 was considered a fugitive by
note 37 (discussing fugitive aliens); Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., ICE
Apprehends More Than 2,100 Criminal Aliens, Gang Members, Fugitives and Other
Immigration Violators in Nationwide Interior Enforcement Operation (June 14, 2006),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0926.shtm.
91. The Immigration Justice Clinic at Cardozo School of Law litigated ICE's refusal to
disclose policy memoranda and arrest statistics in response to the Clinic's Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request. Immigration Justice Clinic, Cardozo Sch. of Law,
Immigration Justice Clinic News, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/immigrationnews (last visited
May 8, 2009).
92. See Immigration Justice Clinic, Cardozo Sch. of Law, ICE FOIA Documents,
http://cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profies/immigrationlaw-741/memos%20and
%20data.pdf (last visited May 8, 2009) [hereinafter ICE FOIA Documents]. Note that of
the arrests that do fall within one of the five priority categories, the vast majority falls
within the lowest category-those individuals who have received an order of deportation
but have no criminal history. This category, in addition to the collateral arrests, accounts
for seventy-three percent of the nearly 97,000 arrests by Fugitive Operations Teams from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2008. MENDELSON, STROM & WISHNIE, supra note 42, at 1.
93. See ICE FOIA Documents, supra note 92. The total number of collateral arrests
between fiscal years 2005 and 2008 was 27,834.
94. See Tom Lochner, ACLU Asks for Details on Migrant Deportations, THE
OAKLAND TR., Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.insidebayarea.com/search/ci_5406654.
95. See Kevin Mayhood, Ohio Sweep Nets 154: Federal Authorities Track Down
Immigrants from 30 Countries Living Illegally in the State, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 15,
2006, at 1E.
96. See Bernstein, supra note 82. Officials gave differing estimates; this figure is based
on the only account of the total arrests for both counties.
97. Nina Bernstein, Hunts for 'Fugitive Aliens' Lead to Collateral Arrests, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B5.
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ICE.9s In a raid in Passaic, New Jersey, ICE officers reported raiding
thirteen homes looking for six targets.99
There are several possible explanations for the imbalance between the
number of collateral and targeted arrests. Mr. Chertoff spoke of the need
for "swift and safe arrest[s]" and fiscal efficiency,1°° and the high number of
collateral arrests may be the result of these emphases. With the increased
arrest quota of 1000 arrests per year in 2006, the agency subsequently
dropped previous requirements that a vast majority of the arrests be
"criminal" or "fugitive aliens." '  Additionally, a report by the DHS
Inspector General concluded that an estimated fifty percent of the data in
the database relied on by the Fugitive Operations Teams is inaccurate and
an even greater percentage is incomplete. 2  Also, while Fugitive
Operations Teams are instructed to coordinate with local law enforcement
before conducting a raid," 3 they do not always do so, and, therefore, do
not receive updated information on their targets.1°4
Local law enforcement officials in Nassau County, New York,
participated in some of the raids that formed the basis for a class action
lawsuit against ICE. The day after the raids, the Police Commissioner and
the County Executive denounced the way the raids were conducted. They
said there were "clear dangers of friendly fire" and that the raids were
based on wrong or outdated addresses." The Nassau County Executive
wrote to then-Secretary Chertoff calling for an investigation into alleged
"misconduct and malfeasance" on the part of ICE."°6  The Police
Commissioner stated: "You have to have some reason to believe the target
will be there when you enter a home.... When you have 96 warrants and
98. See Press Release, ICE, Dep't of Homeland Sec., ICE Fugitive Operations Teams
Arrest 217 Immigration Violators (May 1, 2007), available at www.ice.gov/pi/news/
newsreleases/articles/070501newark.htm.
99. Meredith Mandell, Immigration Raid Raises Questions About Passaic's 'Safe
Haven' Status, N.J. HERALD NEWS, Mar. 9, 2008 (on file with the author). The report did
not include the number of arrests that resulted from the raids nor the number of original
targets actually found, but the ratio of targets to houses raided indicates a potentially high
proportion of collateral arrests.
100. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
101. See ICE FOIA Documents, supra note 92. Fugitive Operations Teams were
originally required to make 125 "fugitive alien" arrests in 2003. In 2004, agency officials
required that seventy-five percent of the individuals arrested be "criminal aliens." OIG
REPORT, supra note 36, at 8. The change in the proportion of collateral arrests due to the
Obama Administration's policy change from requiring 1000 arrests per year to requiring
the identification and targeting of 600 "fugitive aliens" per year per team plus an additional
500 "fugitive aliens" through operations with other teams is too recent to be measurable.
See Aizenman, supra note 48.
102. OIG REPORT, supra note 36, at 15.
103. See Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
104. Bernstein, supra note 82.
105. Id
106. Id.
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you only find six of them, it's hard to make the argument that you had a
good faith basis to enter those houses."10 7 The Police Commissioner also
reported that ICE agents repeatedly declined offers to check their list of
targets against the local database that is updated daily." 8 The ICE agent in
charge of the raids responded: "These people are very transient. They
don't stay at that location.... We keep going to these different places
until we find them." 109
The next section describes the actual experiences of numerous raid
victims, all of whom were "collateral arrests," and analyzes the
constitutional violations that occurred in the course of raids on their
homes. It also examines the doctrinal obstacles that could prevent raid
victims from prevailing on these constitutional claims.
II.
HOME RAIDS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ICE's CURRENT
PRAcTICE GIVES RISE TO MULTIPLE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
This section of the paper explores the constitutionality of ICE's
practice by examining Supreme Court precedent in the context of
descriptions of home raids throughout the country. This section also
discusses the implication of that analysis for public policy. Supreme Court
precedent on the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the balance
between the state interest in administrative searches and privacy interests
in the home establishes that the Fourth Amendment governs immigration
home raids. However, ICE's practices typically fall short of meeting
Fourth Amendment standards at three distinct points: entering the home,
searching all rooms in the home, and gathering residents in one room and
questioning them regarding identification and immigration status. Consent
to enter is generally coerced. The rubric of "protective sweeps" is
inapposite to agency practice, and the searches are without legal basis. In
addition, residents are illegally seized in the course of being corralled and
cannot provide valid consent to agents' questioning. This section also
discusses the possibility that weaknesses in the Fourth Amendment
doctrine, such as the limited precedential value of "totality of the
circumstances" tests and concessions intended to protect officer safety,
could undermine the constitutional claims of people subjected to raids.
While doctrinal idiosyncrasies might defeat a motion to suppress or a
damages action, they do not justify a public policy that violates the over-
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A. The Fourth Amendment Applies to Home Raids by Immigration
Officials
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. '  Its well-accepted purpose is "to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials."'' The Supreme Court has questioned who qualifies as one of
"the people," however, and has not provided a definitive answer."' Also,
the Fourth Amendment's requirements with respect to probable cause and
the issuance of a warrant are not as strict when enforcing administrative
law as they are in the enforcement of criminal law."3 Together, this means
that the scope of the Fourth Amendment depends on what law is being
enforced, how, and against whom.
This section argues that the Fourth Amendment protects all
individuals lawfully present in the United States as well as many who are
present unlawfully, and that the administrative nature of immigration law
does not mitigate its protections in the context of home raids.
Additionally, this section argues that agency regulations, internal manuals,
and official statements recognize the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in immigration enforcement and, therefore, that ICE agents'
actions should conform to the Constitution. Finally, this section discusses
the limited application of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings and
the calls for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision on this issue.
The first question is to whom does the Fourth Amendment apply in
the criminal context. If the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the
criminal context, it is unlikely to apply in the less demanding context of
administrative law. With respect to the application of the Fourth
Amendment to noncitizens, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment protects a Mexican citizen, lawfully present in the United
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
112. See United States v. Verdurgo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-71 (1990).
113. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
("Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not
reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause. We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, when 'special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable."') (internal citations omitted); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)
("[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably
determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of
commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic
inspections undertaken for specific purposes."); Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-39 (holding that
area searches can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent individualized
probable cause of a regulatory violation).
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States, in a criminal proceeding.114 It was left uncertain, however, whether
the exclusionary rule would be available in removal proceedings to remedy
Fourth Amendment violations.115 In deciding the reach of the exclusionary
rule in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court assumed that the Fourth
Amendment protected illegal aliens." 6  In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Court explained that the assumption made by the Lopez-
Mendoza Court was not binding and specifically declined to answer the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment protects illegal aliens in
criminal investigations." 7 In Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. officials searched a
Mexican national's home in Mexico, confiscated drugs, and brought the
Mexican national to the United States to be arraigned on criminal charges.
The Court suggested that an individual would be one of "the people"
protected by the Fourth Amendment if she were present in the United
States voluntarily and had "accepted some societal obligations" or
"developed substantial connections with this country."" 8 The precedential
value of this portion of the Court's opinion is complicated by the fact that
Justice Kennedy concurred in the opinion but rejected the idea that the
text "the people" provides any authority for restricting the category of
persons protected by the Fourth Amendment.119 Justice Kennedy went on
to say that if the search had been conducted in the United States, he had
"little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth Amendment would
apply., 120 Therefore, despite the Court's holding, it does not appear that
there were actually five votes for the proposition that some individuals
living in the United States might not be protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 2 1 Additionally, the Court stated that the "illegal aliens in
Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had
accepted some societal obligations," thereby suggesting that the
114. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). Border Patrol
searched the car of a Mexican citizen without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and
not as part of a border search. The agents found marijuana, and the Mexican citizen was
convicted of criminal charges. Id at 267-68.
115. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
116. See id. at 1050.
117. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to the search by American authorities of the Mexican residence of a Mexican
citizen).
118. Id at 271,273.
119. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[E]xplicit recognition of 'the right of the
people' to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the importance
of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert it.").
120. Id. at 278.
121. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but not the opinion, stating that the
respondent was lawfully in the United States because he was brought to the United States
in criminal custody and, therefore, was covered by the Fourth Amendment. He concurred
in the judgment because the search was reasonable in his opinion. See id. at 279 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
THE ICE STORM IN U.S. HOMES
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to noncitizens who
are lawfully present in the United States.122 But the Court did not describe
what constitutes sufficient societal obligations.
Many of the families described in this article whose homes have been
raided are of mixed immigration status, often including U.S. citizen
children and some lawful permanent resident members. As such, many
occupants of these homes would enjoy the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment under Verdugo-Urquidez in the criminal context. Those
occupants who are not lawfully in the United States are still here
voluntarily and may have accepted sufficient "societal obligations" to be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the immigration status
of a home's occupants is unlikely to limit the application of the Fourth
Amendment in home raids.
Also, the immigration status of a home's occupants or the extent of
their "societal obligations" is not immediately apparent to ICE agents.
This information is only learned later in the encounter. Agents should
assume that the Fourth Amendment applies from the outset. Otherwise,
agents would be justifying state action that does not conform to the Fourth
Amendment with information gathered only after the action was taken.
Such ex-post findings cannot be the basis for unconstitutional behavior. In
an analogous situation, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld reasoned that the
Due Process Clause applies to a U.S. citizen challenging her status as an
enemy combatant and, therefore, only after that status was confirmed
could fewer constitutional protections attach.123
The nature of the law being enforced also affects the level of
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause and a
warrant, or circumstances that constitute an exception to the warrant
requirement, are requirements of criminal law enforcement. However, in
civil law enforcement, courts determine whether an administrative search
was reasonable by balancing the state interest in the search against the
122. Id. at 273 (majority opinion). Lower courts have split on whether and when
illegal aliens have Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459
F.3d 618, 624 (5th Cir. 2006) (questioning whether there was a majority for the requirement
of a substantial connection to the United States in addition to voluntary presence); United
States v. Ulah, No. 04-CR-30A(F), 2005 WL 629487, at *29-30 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005)
(holding that illegal aliens can never establish substantial connections to trigger the
protections of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d
1254, 1261 (D. Utah 2003) ("This court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy's
direct statement that he was joining the Court's opinion."); United States v. Guitterez, 983
F. Supp. 905, 912-15 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting Verdugo-Urquidez as a plurality and
finding an illegal alien need not demonstrate a "connection" with this country as a
prerequisite to asserting the shelter of the Fourth Amendment), rev'd on other grounds,
203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999).
123. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524 (2004) ("Even in cases in which the
detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what
process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status.").
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degree of invasion the search entails.'24 In evaluating the level of intrusion,
courts have considered the following factors: prior notice of the search,'25
the amount of discretion exercised by the officer in choosing whom to
search,126 a diminished expectation of privacy,"7 the location of the
search,l2 8 the duration of a seizure required to effectuate a search,12 9 and
the invasiveness of the search. 30
The government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is certainly
legitimate and substantial. On the other hand, all of the factors indicating
level of intrusion point toward a severe intrusion of privacy in home raids.
In particular, the invasion of privacy in one's own home implicates the core
of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court described arbitrary
searches of one's home as the "chief evil" against which the Fourth
Amendment aims to protect' and has referred to "the Fourth
Amendment sanctity of the home."'32
The Court in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco addressed
whether probable cause and a warrant were required for entry into a home
to conduct an administrative safety inspection in the absence of consent.133
In balancing the competing interests, it determined that probable cause of
a safety violation in a specific building was not required, but a warrant
124. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
125. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989).
126. Less discretion by officers makes a search less intrusive. See Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
559 (1976); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1976).
127. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (finding drug testing of railroad employees
acceptable in part because they are in a pervasively regulated industry); Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 666-67 (permitting drug testing of U.S. Customs employees upon promotion or
application for sensitive positions).
128. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57 (students in a public school environment); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 625 (in a medical environment).
129. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52; United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 542-43 (1985); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
130. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663 (aural rather than visual monitoring of urine collection
for drug testing); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (holding that a search in a
school for administrative purposes "will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction"); United States v.
Charleus, 871 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1989) (removal of shoes, pulling down girdle or lifting skirt
in private room is less intrusive than body cavity or full strip search and not unreasonable in
a border search); Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.S.D. 1998) (strip search
of eighth grade students to look for stolen money unreasonable).
131. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (holding that use of thermal imaging
devices to determine that part of home was substantially warmer than the rest of home and
neighbors' homes in a marijuana investigation was a search).
133. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967).
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was.134  A modified warrant procedure was required because
"administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions
upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." '135 Given the
significant privacy interests at stake and the Court's previous holding on
administrative searches of homes, the administrative nature of immigration
law should not reduce the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
in the context of home raids.
ICE's own position has conformed to the doctrinal arguments
suggesting that the Fourth Amendment applies in immigration home raid.
ICE's regulations,"' internal guidelines,137 and policy statements138 all draw
on the standards and requirements of the Fourth Amendment. As a result,
the actions of ICE agents when conducting home raids should be judged
against the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
While the Fourth Amendment may govern ICE's conduct in home
raids, the availability of a remedy for a violation is a separate issue. The
Supreme Court created the remedy of the exclusionary rule, which bars
the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
against that person in a criminal proceeding.139 The primary rationale
offered for the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officers from
violating constitutional rights."4
134. Id. at 538-39 (warrant could be issued based on generalized facts such as passage
of time or an established area-wide inspection program).
135. Id at 534.
136. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1) (2009) ("Interrogation is questioning designed to
elicit specific information. An immigration officer, like any other person, has the right to
ask questions of anyone as long as the immigration officer does not restrain the freedom of
an individual, not under arrest, to walk away."); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2009) ("If the
immigration officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the
person being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against the United
States or is an alien illegally in the United States, the immigration officer may briefly detain
the person for questioning."); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2009) ("An immigration officer may
not enter into the non-public areas of a ...residence including the curtilage of such
residence... for the purpose of questioning the occupants... concerning their right to be
or remain in the United States unless the officer has either a warrant or the consent of the
owner or other person in control of the site to be inspected.").
137. Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers, in 1
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (2009).
138. See generally Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Authority of INS Officers to Assist
State Enforcement Operations, 8 Op. INS Gen. Counsel 91-36 (1991).
139. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The exclusionary rule was
applied to Fourth Amendment violations by state police in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657
(1961).
140. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648. Weeks also discussed the rationale of judicial integrity,
which requires that courts not sanction illegal searches by admitting the fruits of illegality
into evidence. 232 U.S. at 394. Mapp shifted the focus to deterrence as the sole rationale.
Judicial integrity has been abandoned in the Court's more recent decisions related to the
application of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-
45 (1984); United States. v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-54 (1976).
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Generally, home raids result in civil removal proceedings against
individuals who cannot prove their lawful status rather than criminal
charges. Questioning the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in
removal proceedings and noting its high cost, the Supreme Court limited
its application in civil removal proceedings to "egregious violations of the
Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of
fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained." '141 The Court also said that it might reconsider the need for the
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings "if there developed good
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were
widespread."'42 In light of more aggressive enforcement and increasing
reports of constitutional violations by ICE, legal commentators have called
for the Court to reexamine its position on the application of the
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings.'43 Individuals subjected to home
raids can advocate for immigration courts to apply the exclusionary rule
under Lopez-Mendoza, but they must convince the immigration judge that
the violation was egregious or that such violations are widespread in order
to succeed.'"
It is important to note that the exclusionary rule is only a remedy, and
the absence of the exclusionary rule does not mean that actions by ICE
agents are constitutional. The next section outlines the numerous
violations of the Fourth Amendment that occur in the course of a typical
home raid. The following section argues that ICE policy should not
promote unconstitutional behavior simply because there is often no
consequence for such conduct.
B. Fourth Amendment Violations Occur Regularly in the Course of
Home Raids
The application of the Fourth Amendment in immigration home raids,
141. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.
142. Id at 1050.
143. See e.g., Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe" Widespread
Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 5 Wisc. L. REV. 1109, 1156 (2008) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment violations have become widespread and the exclusionary rule is needed to
constrain ICE); Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in
Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1157, 1161, 1188-91 (2008) (arguing that ICE's
internal guidelines have failed to control Fourth Amendment violations and the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule is needed).
144. See, e.g., In re P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, at 7 (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. June 25,
2008) (on file with author); In re O-R-, at 9 (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. May 1, 2008) (on
file with author); In re N-, at 10-11 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 23, 2007) (on file
with author); In re M-, at 6 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 16, 2007) (on file with
author); Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 5-8, 29 (claiming that
"administrative warrants were being used as a pretext to round up as many undocumented
immigrants as ICE could lay their hands on").
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discussed in the preceding section, is a threshold question. If the Supreme
Court were to decide that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to any
individual present in the United States unlawfully or that the interest in
enforcement of immigration law justified the substantial privacy intrusion,
the following analysis would have much less import for individual cases.
U.S. citizens and lawful residents whose homes were raided might be able
to bring damages actions,'45 but individuals in the same home not
protected by the Fourth Amendment would have little recourse.'46
However, an account of the unconstitutional aspects of ICE's practice
is nevertheless important to evaluating the current policy. The limitations
of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings already mean that
there may not be a legal consequence for constitutional violations in every
case. However, the number and nature of the violations-with or without
the exclusionary remedy-provide the strongest support for abandoning
current policy.
This section presents accounts of victims of home raids as described in
lawsuit complaints, media reports, and immigration court decisions on
motions to suppress evidence acquired in the course of a home raid. 47
Based on these accounts, this section argues that consent to enter is usually
coerced, the search of all rooms in the home is without legal basis, and ICE
agents typically seize residents before questioning them rendering any
consent to answering their questions invalid.
1. Entry: ICE's Practice of Gaining Entry to Homes and Its Constitutional
Failings
There are no accounts of ICE officers possessing judicial warrants
authorizing them to enter the homes of immigrants, and ICE officials do
not claim to possess such warrants. Instead, ICE officials assert that they
obtain consent to enter the homes, 48 obviating the need for a warrant.149
One local law enforcement official who participated in ICE raids has
145. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
146. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-50 (1978) (holding that standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule depends on whether the person has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched). In the absence of protection by the Fourth Amendment,
individuals might be able to challenge ICE's action under the Fifth Amendment right to
due process, but a discussion of alternative checks on state action is beyond the scope of
this paper.
147. Because most of these suits are ongoing or have been settled, no facts have
formally been found by federal courts. The decisions on the motions to suppress represent
the formal findings of immigration judges.
148. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 113-14 (testimony of ICE
Officer Belluardo); Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
149. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is equally well settled
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant
and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." (citations omitted)).
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questioned the veracity of this assertion. Lawrence Mulvey, Commissioner
of Police for Nassau County, stated,
In conversations with representatives of ICE, it was reported to
me that in all 131 homes they asked for and received consent to
enter .... In my 29 years of police work, I have executed
countless warrants and have sought consent to enter countless
homes. ICE's claim that they received 100% compliance with
their requests to enter is not credible under even the best of
circumstances.15
0
Numerous accounts of home raids describe ICE agents entering
residences by force. In a class action brought in Georgia regarding raids
conducted in southeastern Georgia in September 2006, Gladis Espitia
stated that eighteen vehicles surrounded her home on September 2,
2006.1" Several ICE agents handcuffed members of Ms. Espitia's family
who were outside while other agents knocked on the door.a52 Ms. Espitia
reported that at least one of the agents threatened to break down the door
and throw gas inside the home.'53 None of the family members opened the
door.154 Ms. Espitia reported that the ICE agents broke through her front
door, damaging the frame and lock, and searched her home.155 She stated
that some of the agents again threatened to use gas to get the family
members out of the bedroom.15 6 Several individuals who rented rooms in a
boarding house in Riverhead, New York, reported waking at 4:30 a.m. on
April 18, 2007, to banging on the outside doors. 57 The agents reportedly
forced open the back door after denting the front door and pounding a
hole in the wall around the front lock. 5 ' These individuals were taken to a
150. Mulvey Declaration, supra note 64, 10.
151. Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, 57.
152. Id. T 58.
153. Id.
154. Id. 59.
155. Id. TT 59-60.
156. Id. 60. David Robinson owns two trailer parks in Georgia that were raided. He
reported that one of the trailer parks was raided on September 7, 2006, and the other on
September 3, 2006, and September 5, 2006. Id. 67. In the course of the three raids, Mr.
Robinson stated that ICE officers forcibly entered many of the trailers, caused damage to a
door and several windows in several homes, and pulled the skirting off another trailer and
intentionally damaged its floor -d. T 67-68.
In In re M-, the respondent describes a raid outside New York City on April 18, 2007,
in which ICE officers gained entry to the home by (1) pushing in a window air conditioner
and then entering via the window, and (2) opening an unlocked window in the kitchen and
entering the home. Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 15.
Numerous plaintiffs in Aguilar, Arias, and Mancha describe ICE agents forcibly entering
their homes. Arias Complaint, supra note 51, IT 68, 71; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51,
TT 59, 68; AguilarComplaint, supra note 20, 17, 19, 21.
157. Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, T 19.
158. Id. T 204.
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processing center in New York City and released after several hours
without money to get home.'59 In such cases, lack of consent is evident in
the broken doors and windows.
However, these cases may be outliers. There are also accounts of ICE
leaving a home if no resident opens the door, indicating that ICE does not
always enter the homes they intend to raid by one method or another."6
ICE's conduct as described by its officials may be a better indicator of the
prevailing practice or may at least serve as a baseline from which to
evaluate the constitutionality of ICE's official policy. This section
examines the legal standard for consent and argues that under the totality
of the circumstances, ICE gains entry via coercion, not voluntary
cooperation.
a) Examples of ICE's Current Practice
An immigration judge suppressed evidence obtained by the
government and terminated the removal proceeding against Mr. P-, finding
that consent to enter his home was involuntary and "granted in submission
to authority. 16' Mr. P- testified that he was awoken at 4:45 a.m. by
banging on his front door.62 When he opened the window and looked out,
he saw six individuals who identified themselves as police and told him to
open the door; he saw they were wearing guns and uniforms, and he did
what they told him to do. 63
The Center for Social Justice at Seton Hall School of Law is
159. Id. 202-03. Several other individuals who rented rooms in a boarding house in
Mount Kisco, New York, reported almost an identical experience on March 19, 2007,
beginning at around 4:00 a.m. Id. IT 209-18.
160. One New York family reported waking up at 5:30 a.m. to shouts of "Immigration.
Open the door." The agents reportedly tried to break open the door but could not. The
family refused to open the door and reported telling the agents that they wanted to see a
warrant and to slide it under the door. An agent reportedly said that they would go get the
necessary papers if the family would not let them in. The agents then told the family that
they were police and the family should not be afraid and should open the door. The family
continued to refuse, and the ICE agents eventually left. Id. 223-34.
A complaint filed by thirteen plaintiffs against ICE and New Jersey field officers
includes a report from the Monmouth County Police Department describing a call from an
ICE agent who said ICE had an administrative deportation warrant that it was trying to
serve. The ICE agent knew that the family was home, but nobody would open the door
when the officers knocked at 6:00 a.m. The ICE agent asked a uniformed police officer to
take a marked Freehold Borough Police car to the house and knock on the door and "have
the accused family come to the door. Once someone was to come to the door ICE would
take over the investigation." A police officer complied with the request, but the family did
not answer the door, and both the police and ICE left the scene. Argueta Complaint, supra
note 2, Ex. B.
161. In re P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, at 5 (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. June 25, 2008) (on
file with author).
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
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representing thirteen plaintiffs in their lawsuit arising from raids conducted
from August 2006 to April 2008."6 Their complaint describes the
experience of Mr. Flores, who reports being awoken at 3:00 a.m. to
banging on his front door and shouts of "Police."'' 65 When he opened the
door slightly, the agents forced the door open and went inside. 166 Plaintiff
Covias, in the same lawsuit, states that she woke at 4:00 a.m. to banging on
her front door and shouts of "Paterson Police. ', 167 When she opened the
door to see what was going on, an agent put his foot in the door and then
forced it open the rest of the way.168 When Ms. Covias asked if the agents
had a warrant, an agent said that they just wanted to talk to her.169 Agents
searched each room of her house and arrested her son. 70
Raids in Willmar and Atwater, Minnesota, from April 10-14, 2007, led
to a lawsuit with fifty-seven plaintiffs .' All of the plaintiffs reported ICE
agents banging on their doors and, when asked to identify themselves, ICE
agents saying that they were police. 172 Those individuals who opened their
doors a few inches to confirm the identity of the officers stated that the
ICE agents then forced their way into the homes.173 One individual tried
to hold her door closed, but the ICE officers forced open the door and told
her to step back while motioning for their guns. 174 Three individuals
reported watching ICE agents break into their homes by either forcing
open the door or breaking a window and opening the door. 175 The agents
reportedly told several of the individuals that they were looking for
fugitives, but then they would either not state a name or instead stated
names of people who no longer lived at the location. 176 One individual
stated that when he asked if the agents had a warrant, the agent said, "We
don't need one; we are the authorities and can come into the house. 177
In In re O-R-, respondent's sister, Ms. 0-, described being awoken at
4:30 a.m. on March 26, 2007, at their home in Englewood, New Jersey, by
the incessant buzzing of their doorbell.'78 When she stepped outside of her
164. Argueta Complaint, supra note 2.





170. Id l 129-31.




175. Id. IT 73, 75, 76.
176. Id. 81.
177. Id
178. Affidavit of Ms. C-O- IT 3-4, In re O-R- (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. May 1,
2008) (on file with author).
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apartment to see what was going on, she found approximately five armed
men running up the stairs.17 9 Still in her pajamas, she was soon surrounded
by the men."8 One waived a piece of paper in front of her and said they
had an order for the arrest of M-T-."' The men asked her if they could
enter, and Ms. 0- stated that she believed the arrest order gave them the
right to enter the apartment and that she could not refuse their request. 182
b) Constitutional Challenges to the Current Practice
The legal validity of "consent" for ICE agents to enter a home, if
obtained at all, can be challenged on the basis that it is routinely coerced.
In a typical home raid, ICE agents violate the Constitution from the
minute they enter the premises.
The Supreme Court articulated the test for consent in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, stating that "the question whether a consent to search was in
fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances."' 83 Although the Court did not articulate all of the factors
relevant to assessing the totality of the circumstances in Schneckloth, it
acknowledged that knowledge of one's right to refuse is one factor to be
taken into account.184 In addition, the Court highlighted "subtly coercive
police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents" as additional factors to consider.185 Consent cannot
be "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force." '186 The Court has also stated that consent cannot be shown by "no
179. Id. [ 6-7.
180. Id. 9.
181. Id 10.
182. Id. IT 11-16. In an account that may indicate the results of education efforts by
community groups, Luis Gonzalez of Marin County, California, reported that his wife
called to inform him that ICE officers were pounding on their door on the morning of May
22, 2008. Mr. Gonzalez knew that the administrative warrants carried by ICE agents did
not authorize them to enter a home and told his wife that she did not have to let the agents
in. The agents left without gaining access to their home. Joy Lanzendorfer, ICE Storm:
Recent Immigration Raids in San Rafael's Canal District Have Residents Hiding Behind
Locked Doors, N. BAY BOHEMIAN, June 18, 2008, available at http://www.metroactive.com/
bohemian/06.18.08/news-0825.html.
183. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). The facts in Schneckloth
are illustrative. Following a police officer's routine traffic stop due to an apparent traffic
infraction, the officer asked one of the car's occupants if he could search the car. The man
agreed and opened the trunk. Subsequently, he challenged the use of incriminating
evidence found in the trunk, arguing that he did not know he could refuse the officer's
request and, therefore, that his consent had been involuntary. The Court rejected this
argument.
184. Id. at 229.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 228.
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more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."'87
In developing the totality of the circumstances test, the Schneckloth
Court relied heavily on the Court's cases analyzing the admissibility of a
confession, because these cases balanced similar competing interests: the
need for effective law enforcement and protection of individuals against
overwhelming police power.18s In order for a confession to be admissible,
it must be voluntary. Otherwise "if [the defendant's] will was overborne
and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process."'89  In cases that assess whether the
individual's will was overborne, the Court has looked to (1) the
circumstances of the confession, such as the number of interrogators and
the length and time of day of the interrogation; (2) the conduct of the
officers, such as the use of physical abuse or deceptive tactics; and (3) the
characteristics of the individual interrogated, including her level of
education and her nationality or experience with U.S. law.190 These factors
are instructive in analyzing whether consent is voluntary in a typical home
raid.'
All of the factors looked to by the court in assessing voluntariness
indicate that consent is coerced in a typical home raid. First, ICE engages
in deceptive tactics. Agents often identify themselves as police, which is
misleading at best and false at worst.' 92 Agents sometimes state that they
187. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
188. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-28. In the case of consent searches, the Court was
trying to accommodate the need for investigation before probable cause supporting a
warrant exists, and the equally important need to ensure the absence of coercion in carrying
out that investigation. Id.
189. ld at 225-26 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
190. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) (protection against
threat of violence from other inmates contingent on confession); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (overnight interrogation by many officers including deceptive use of
childhood friend to extract confession; defendant was foreign-born with limited education);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 437, 440 (1958) (confession not involuntary because
defendant was well-educated, given food and allowed to smoke); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 562, 567 (1958) (protection from angry mob contingent on confession; defendant
had fifth grade education); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (thirty-six hours
of continuous questioning); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279, 287 (1936) (physical
abuse by officers).
191. In United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, the Fifth Circuit listed some of the factors
to consider in evaluating whether consent to search was voluntary: "(1) the voluntariness of
the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the
extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's
awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and
(6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found." 898 F.2d 1011,
1013 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Galbraith, 846 F.2d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1988)).
192. ICE spokesperson Lori Haley defended ICE agents' practice of identifying
themselves as police, stating: "They are indeed federal police .... People who don't
understand much English generally understand the word 'police."' Tom Lochner, Federal
Agents Pose as Police to Make Busts" Immigration Authorities Misidentify Themselves to
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have a "warrant," which, in fact, carries no authority to search the home
and no authority to enter the premises to effectuate an administrative
arrest. This confusing nomenclature affects policymakers as well. In
response to criticism of local raids, the mayor of Passaic, New Jersey,
stated: "Immigration warrants are warrants. If they came and took them
away, they must have had the right to take them."193
Alternatively, agents frequently say that they are looking for a
"criminal," either as a pretext or in a misleading manner wherein it refers
to a "fugitive alien" who has already been apprehended and convicted of a
crime as opposed to someone who is suspected of committing a crime and
has not yet been captured. The person allowing ICE agents to enter her
home generally believes that she has no choice because these are police
officers with a warrant, or that she is allowing local police to come inside in
order to further an ongoing criminal investigation in some way.
ICE's deceptive tactics are combined with coercive circumstances.
Home raids are generally conducted early in the morning when most
residents are sleeping, capitalizing on the confusion and disorientation of
the home's occupants when they are awoken.194 They involve at least five
and as many as twenty-five ICE agents.195 Finally, the residents of the
home are often foreign-born with varying levels of education, and many
have no knowledge of their right to refuse entry. 96 Together, these factors
indicate that consent is typically coerced in home raids.
The use of Warrants of Deportation/Removal to gain entry is also
problematic in its own right. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme
Court found that consent is rendered involuntary if it is given in response
to a false statement of possession of a valid warrant. 97 The "warrant"
possessed by ICE agents is not akin to a judicial arrest warrant because it
Gain Entry for Arrests, ALAMEDA TIMES STAR, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://
www.insidebayarea.com/timesstar/ci_5092344.
193. Mandell, supra note 99.
194. Night searches are prohibited absent special circumstances in slightly less than
half of all states. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, DANIEL J. CAPRA & ANGELA J. DAVIS, BASIC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 160 (4th ed. 2005). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
restrict searches to daytime unless reasonable cause is shown. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(c)(2)(ii). Some courts require a showing of exigent circumstances to allow a nighttime
search, tying the time of the search to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992).
195. In Spano v. New York, the Supreme Court held that the number of officers
conducting an interrogation militated against a finding that defendant's confession was
voluntary. 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959). See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text
regarding the connection between the legal standard used to assess the voluntariness of a
confession and voluntariness of consent.
196. See, e.g., In re P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, P-, at 2, 6 (Immigr. Ct., New York, N.Y. June 25,
2008) (on file with author); Affidavit of Ms. C-O-, In re O-R-, supra note 178, at 1 1, 15-
19. See also Spano, 360 U.S. at 321-22 (taking into account defendant's vulnerability due to
his limited education and foreign-born status when finding his confession was involuntary).
197. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
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does not confer authority to enter the home in order to effectuate an arrest
or conduct a search.1 98 While it may be true that the piece of paper ICE
agents carry is nominally a warrant, this piece of paper is a far cry from a
judicial warrant. ICE agents know this.1 99  While their statements
regarding possession of a "warrant" may not be literally false, they are
false in substance, and consent given on this basis should be deemed
involuntary under Bumper.
The most common practice described in accounts of home raids is ICE
agents pushing their way into a home after a resident opens the door to
speak with the agents. In discussing a raid on a Nassau County home,
Christopher Shanahan, the Director of Deportation and Removal for ICE
in the New York region, stated: "Once Erica's grandmother let agents over
the threshold, there was no turning back. ' 2° Importantly, Mr. Shanahan
specified that the agents must be permitted to cross the threshold. Simply
opening the door is not the equivalent of consenting to ICE agents' entry.
2. Search: ICE's Practice of Searching the Entire Home upon Entry Goes
Far Beyond a Protective Sweep
ICE officials have repeatedly justified their practice of searching all of
the rooms of a home they have entered as required for officer safety,20 ' and
former Assistant Secretary Myers stated that "[t]his is a common practice
throughout law enforcement. '2 2 Presumably, these statements are based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Buie, which established
the legality of protective sweeps by police officers. 2 3  However, ICE's
practice does not fit under the rubric of protective sweeps. Protective
sweeps are limited to looking in areas where a person could be, after a
legitimate arrest is made, and only if the agent has reasonable suspicion
that other people are present and represent a danger."0 4 As explained
below, the searches in home raids do not fit within these limits and are
unconstitutional.
198. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37.
199. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 113-14 (testimony of
ICE Officer Belluardo); Bernstein, supra note 67 (describing acknowledgment by ICE
official Christopher Shanahan of limited power of administrative warrants).
200. Bernstein, supra note 67.
201. Id. (quoting ICE official Christopher Shanahan: "Due to officer safety needs,
[agents] can look into other areas, to clear rooms."); Myers Letter, supra note 50
(describing how officers "searched the immediate area for potential weapons for officer
safety").
202. Myers Letter, supra note 50.
203. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1990). After an armed robbery, police
obtained arrest warrants for Buie and an accomplice. Police went to Buie's house and
arrested him when he came out of the basement. Police looked around the basement to see
if anyone else was there and found incriminating evidence in plain view. Id. at 328.
204. Id at 334-35.
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a) Examples of ICE's Current Practice
In In re M-, the respondent describes a raid on his home outside New
York City on April 18, 2007, in which ICE agents possessed a Warrant of
Deportation/Removal for Mr. B-, respondent's roommate.2 °5 Mr. B-
identified himself immediately to the ICE agents and was arrested.2 6
However, rather than leaving the residence with their target, agents
proceeded to enter all of the bedrooms in the home without knocking, to
handcuff everyone they found, and to bring them to the kitchen where
they were interrogated.2 °7 Without asking permission, agents searched
wallets, dressers, closets, and under beds looking for people and
immigration paperwork.2 8
In In re N-, the immigration judge decided that the respondents had
established a prima facie case that the government's evidence against them
was obtained unlawfully via a home raid.209 The respondents stated that
ICE agents entered the apartment when one resident opened the back
door.21' After handcuffing that resident upon entry, three officers entered
the bedrooms and living room of the apartment where they awoke and
questioned the other occupants of the home.211 The immigration judge
specifically found that the search was not likely justifiable as a protective
sweep and granted respondents' request for a suppression hearing.
The class action filed against ICE as a result of raids conducted in and
around New York City throughout 2007 includes an account of the raid on
the Leon-Aguilar family, all of whom are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents.21 3  On February 20, 2007, the Leon-Aguilar family reported
waking at around 4:30 a.m. to the doorbell ringing and banging on the
front door.214 Elena Leon reported opening the door and several ICE
agents immediately entering her home. 215  The agents reportedly
proceeded through the home banging on and opening doors to the rooms
and searching the basement.1 6 Adriana Aguilar was asleep with her four-
year-old son when she was awoken by ICE agents pulling off their covers
205. Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 1-2.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 4.
209. See In re N-, at 10 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 23, 2007) (on file with
author).
210. Id. at 5.
211. Id. at 4-5.
212. Id. at 9, 16.
213. Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, IT 14-32.
214. Id. IT 99-101.
215. Id. I 103-08.
216. Id. 113.
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and shining a flashlight into her face." 7
In Otero County, New Mexico, ICE raids in early September 2007 also
resulted in a lawsuit .2" The complaint describes one family who reported
waking up to banging on the walls of their home sometime before 6:00 a.m.
on September 10, 2007.219 The family, including an elderly grandmother
suffering from terminal cancer and a woman who was eight months
pregnant, were told to get outside and were not allowed to bring their
coats or shoes. 220 They watched as the deputies proceeded to empty out
drawers, cabinets, and the contents of one individual's purse, presumably
looking for evidence of immigration status.221
b) Constitutional Challenges to the Current Practice
Protective sweeps are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of a warrant and probable cause in order for a search to be
reasonable. The Buie Court held that, as a precautionary measure, officers
may look in areas immediately adjacent to an arrest "from which an attack
could be immediately launched" without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.222 To conduct a protective sweep beyond this area, the Court held
that officers must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, that other people are present and represent a risk of harm
to the officers or other individuals in the home.23 The Court was clear in
limiting officers' incident search powers to spaces large enough to contain
a person, of which they could perform only a cursory inspection lasting "no
longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger., 224
In the context of home raids, as illustrated above, a search often occurs
before any arrest, if an arrest takes place at all. This practice conflicts with
the facts and rationale in Buie, which was based on the Court's decisions in
217. Bernstein, supra note 67 (reporting the raid of the Leon-Aguilar home). Several
family members were taken to the home's office space where ICE agents blocked the doors
to the exits. Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, $ 116-17. One of the officers stated that
they were looking for a man with the same name as Adriana's ex-husband. Id. at 127-
28. She had been divorced from this man for five years and purchased her home with her
new husband. Id. 129-30. Ms. Aguilar asked to see a warrant and reported that one of
the officers opened and closed a manila folder that they said contained a warrant but would
not allow her to see it. Id 133-39.
218. Daniel T Complaint, supra note 51, at 1. The local sheriffs department, which
receives money from DHS to curb crime, conducted the raids and then detained individuals
for questioning by federal immigration officers. Id. 21-22. See also Alicia A. Caldwell,
Groups Sue NM County After Immigration Raids, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18, 2007.
219. Daniel T Complaint, supra note 51, 1 T 28-29.
220. Id 42-43.
221. Id. 1 47.
222. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
223. Id
224. Id. at 334-36.
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Terry v. Ohic25 and Michigan v. Long."26 These cases did not involve
indiscriminate and dragnet-type searches. Instead, officers possessed
probable cause and an arrest warrant for Buie,227 reasonable suspicion that
Terry was armed and dangerous, 8 and reasonable suspicion that Long was
dangerous and might have a weapon in his adjacent car. 229 The Court in
these cases emphasized that the encounter itself might have been
dangerous either because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the
person could access a weapon or because of the general risk of ambush
when arresting someone in her own home for a criminal offense."' This
danger justified an incident search to protect officer safety. 3 In contrast,
in home raids, ICE agents do not have probable cause to support a
criminal arrest and may not even have probable cause that any particular
person in the home committed an immigration violation, if they are relying
on outdated or incomplete information. Nor do agents generally have a
particularized ground to believe that other residents represent a danger
when they search all rooms of a home. The Court has been careful to
cabin searches justified by officer safety, rather than probable cause and a
warrant, in order to prevent fishing expeditions.232 Where agents search
first, no formal law enforcement encounter recognized by the Fourth
Amendment (e.g., a stop or arrest) has yet occurred. Therefore, at the
time of the search in a typical home raid, there is no dangerous event that
would justify a search to protect officer safety.
ICE is mischaracterizing its searches. Searches conducted by ICE
agents are not protective sweeps; they are not part of the process of
arresting a person for whom the agents possess probable cause and a
warrant. Searches by ICE agents are typically roundups that generate the
arrests in home raids. As such, the purpose of these searches is
investigative, not protective-exactly what the Buie Court rejected in
scope and rationale. 33
225. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
226. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Buie, the Court stated: "The
ingredients to apply the balance struck in Terry and Long are present in this case." 494
U.S. at 332.
227. Buie, 494 U.S. at 330. In fact, the arresting officers in Buie had a warrant.
228. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
229. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.
230. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333 (citing Terry and Long).
231. Id. at 336 ("The type of search we authorize today ... is decidedly not
'automati[c],' but may be conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.").
232. See e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718-19 (2009); Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-
36; Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26.
233. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36 ("We should emphasize that such a protective sweep,
aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless
not a full search of the premises.").
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
2009]
594 N Y U. REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 33:561
3. Seizure. ICE's Practice of Corralling All Residents Results in Unlawful
Seizures and Involuntary Questioning
Mr. Chertoff and Ms. Myers noted that ICE officers can question any
person as to their right to be in the United States,'3 ' and, if residents
comply with these requests, they do so voluntarily.23 5 Typically, residents
do give ICE officers identification, which often reveals their immigration
status, or they concede that they do not have legal authority to be in the
United States in response to agents' questions. 36 Once agents learn that
an individual does not have legal authority to be in the United States, they
can arrest the individual without a warrant and detain her for further
questioning so long as they have reason to believe the person is likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained.237
This section argues that the initial exchange with ICE agents is not
voluntary. Instead, individuals typically answer ICE's questions after they
have been illegally seized, rendering their consent to answering agents'
questions invalid.238 The Fourth Amendment encompasses encounters that
fall short of a full arrest; to seize someone, the officer must have
234. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50. For the statutory
language supporting this proposition and an explanation of the need for reasonable
suspicion that the individual in question is a noncitizen, see supra note 72.
The Supreme Court's decision in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), provides some
support for the government's assertion that ICE agents can question anyone about her
immigration status. In Mena, the defendant was handcuffed and detained in a garage at a
friend's home for several hours while police executed a criminal search warrant to look for
weapons and evidence of gang membership. While handcuffed, she was questioned about
her immigration status. Id, at 95-96. The Court held that police questioning regarding
immigration status did not constitute an additional seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
which would have required independent reasonable suspicion that she was present in the
United States in violation of the immigration laws. Id, at 102. Relying on Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991), the Court affirmed that police questioning alone does not
constitute a stop or seizure recognized by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 101. While this
case supports ICE's assertion that agents can request immigration status information
without reasonable suspicion, it does not follow that there is no seizure in a typical home
raid. Mena did not change the standard for what constitutes a seizure. In Mena, the Court
held that the seizure connected to the search warrant was lawful and the questioning on
immigration status did not prolong the seizure so there was no separate, immigration-
related seizure of Mena. In home raids there are numerous indications that a seizure has
occurred; however, there are no criminal search warrants that could provide a lawful basis
for the seizure of a home's occupants, during which residents could also be questioned
regarding their status. Instead, residents are seized for the sole purpose of being
questioned about their status, and the duration of the seizure is defined by the duration of
the immigration-related questioning, not by the execution of an independent search
warrant.
235. Chertoff Letter, supra note 37; Myers Letter, supra note 50.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 14, 246.
237. See supra text accompanying note 74.
238. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1983) (plurality opinion).
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reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.239 In home raids, it is difficult to
imagine how ICE agents would have reasonable suspicion to seize every
occupant of a home simply because they have a Warrant of
Deportation/Removal for one person or, in the absence of a Warrant, a
belief that a particular "fugitive alien" resides in the home. In many cases,
the target is not present at the home, or the agents do not inform the
residents of the identity of their target. Nonetheless, agents systematically
corral all of the occupants without any basis to suspect that each and every
individual is in violation of the immigration laws. As a result, any consent
to answer questions by illegally seized individuals is involuntary and the
unconstitutionally-gathered information these individuals provide cannot
be used as a basis for arrests.
a) Examples of ICE's Current Practice
In In re O-R-, the respondent testified that he was awakened at 4:30
a.m. on March 26, 2007, when ICE agents entered his bedroom. 240 He was
told to go to the living room but was given permission to change out of his
pajamas first.241 Mr. O-R- testified that the rest of his family was in the
living room when he got there, and ICE agents blocked the doors to the
exits of the living room.242 He stated that he was not permitted to use the
bathroom in private.243 When his sister stood up in the living room, ICE
agents told her to sit down and that, if she did not sit down, she could be
arrested.2' The officers told Mr. O-R- to go with one of them to get his
identification, which he did.245 ICE Officer Belluardo, who testified in In
re O-R-, stated that ICE's general procedure is to gather every person in
the house in one central location and then "we ID each person to find out
who they are and their status in the United States., 24 6 She testified that
corralling occupants and demanding identification is not based on specific
facts regarding those individuals.247
A recent Georgia class action is based, in part, on the experience of
Ranulfo Perez.248 Mr. Perez reported being confronted by approximately
fifteen ICE agents in front of his home on September 5, 2006.249 As he told
them that he had "papers," one of the agents reportedly grabbed Mr.
239. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19.
240. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 3.
241. Id.




246. Id. at 107 (testimony of ICE Officer Belluardo).
247. Id. at 109.
248. Mancha Complaint, supra note 51.
249. Id. $ 36.
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Perez by his shirt, put his gun to Mr. Perez's side, and held him against his
truck."' 0 The officer told him not to move and held him there for ten
minutes while he ordered other officers to go inside Mr. Perez's home.25 '
The officer then searched Mr. Perez for weapons and told him to show
proof of his immigration status.252 The officer verified Mr. Perez's
information and reportedly told him that these were immigration agents,
that they would be in the area for another two weeks, and that Mr. Perez
and his family should leave the area during this time to avoid future
incidents at his home.253
In Tennessee, twelve people subjected to home raids brought a civil
action against the Sheriff of Maury County, where the raids took place, as
well as ICE administrators and officers 4.2 " The plaintiffs in this lawsuit
describe a raid of mobile homes at 6:00 a.m. on July 3, 2007.255 One of the
plaintiffs saw ICE officers at his front door and sheriff's deputies at his
back door.256 He reported that when he didn't open the door, ICE officers
forcibly opened the front door and then instructed him to open the back
door. 7 While being questioned, he stood up to use the bathroom and an
ICE agent pointed his gun at him and told him to stay where he was. 8
In a lawsuit resulting from raids in Minnesota, the plaintiffs reported
that all Latino members in the raided households were brought to a
common area in each home, placed in handcuffs, and interrogated. 9
Several individuals reported that they were not allowed to change out of
their sleeping clothes.26 ° One individual reported that she had suffered an
ectopic pregnancy and was denied use of the bathroom despite heavy
bleeding.2 6' She also reported being forced to change in front of the
officers.262 Two white plaintiffs reported that they were not asked for
identification or proof of immigration status when ICE agents entered
their homes.263
250. Id, 37.
251. Id. T 38-39.
252. Id 141.
253. Id
254. Flores-Morales Complaint, supra note 51, 1; Immigrants Say They Were
Illegally Arrested, NEWSCHANNEL5.COM, July 10, 2007, http://www.newschannel5.com/
Global/story.asp?S=6771363.
255. Flores-Morales Complaint, supra note 51, 22(c).
256. Id. T 40.
257. Id
258. Id.
259. Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 1 82.
260. Id 84.
261. Id. T 87.
262. Id. T 84.
263. Id, T 91-92.
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b) Constitutional Challenges to the Current Practice
In Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment encompasses seizures that fall short of a full arrest and
articulated the test for a seizure, stating that "a court must consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter. 2 64 In an earlier decision, the Court noted circumstances that
might indicate seizure, including "the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of
the person or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled., 265 In California
v. Hodari D., the Court required that in cases in which an officer has not
physically touched an individual, the individual must actually submit to a
show of authority for a seizure to occur.266 And in INS v. Delgado, the
Court made clear that a police officer's request for identification or
questioning as to an individual's identity is unlikely, by itself, to constitute
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.267
In a typical home raid, ICE agents seize residents before requesting
identification or questioning an individual about her immigration status.
Numerous accounts of raids include descriptions of individuals being
physically touched by ICE agents and often handcuffed at the start of the
encounter, which automatically constitutes a seizure under HodariD.268
In addition, residents typically report submitting to a show of force.
Individuals subjected to raids report being woken by flashlights or
shouting and banging, finding numerous ICE agents in their home, and
being told either to produce identification at that point or to go to a
common area where they are then told to produce identification.269
Individuals invariably report being yelled at by agents and seeing agents
block the doors to the home. 27' Numerous individuals report being told
they could not put on additional clothes or use the bathroom in private.2 1
264. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991).
265. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
266. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1991).
267. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
268. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625.
269. See, e.g., In re M-, at 1, 3 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Ca. Aug. 16, 2007) (on file
with author); Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 3-4; Arias Complaint,
supra note 51, J1 70, 82; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, 57, 97, 112, 163, 170, 173.
270. See, e.g., In re O-R-, at 4 (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. May 1, 2008) (on file with
author); Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, 1 82, 87, 105; Aguilar Complaint, supra note
20, 152; Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 2.
271. See, e.g., In re O-R-, at 4 (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. May 1, 2008) (on file with
author); Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 84; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2, % 64;
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This last element is particularly indicative of a seizure, because if an agent
does not allow an individual to decline the encounter in order to engage in
an exceedingly private activity, an individual is reasonable in believing the
agents would not permit her to decline a request for identification. If
agents gather occupants in a common area before interrogating them, it is
common practice for agents to block the exits from that room as well.272
As discussed, many accounts include reports of agents pulling out their
guns or motioning at their guns and, because of such conduct, most
residents follow the agents' orders. As a result, questioning by ICE
officers generally takes place after residents have been seized.
For a seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, officers
must have reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is occurring."3 While
reasonable suspicion is a somewhat amorphous concept, the Court in
United States v. Cortez articulated the baseline requirement that "[b]ased
upon the whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity." '274 Additionally, the Court held in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce that race or ethnicity can be a factor that supports reasonable
suspicion, but it cannot be the only factor.275 In other words, the fact a
home's resident appears Latino is not enough on its own to support her
seizure by ICE agents. ICE agents may have reasonable suspicion that an
individual named in a Warrant of Deportation/Removal is violating
immigration laws. However, it is difficult to imagine how agents would
have the necessary reasonable suspicion for each and every person in a
home sufficient to justify seizing them. ICE Officer Belluardo's testimony
regarding the agency's policy of corralling all residents and holding them
for questioning276 lends further support to the conclusion that the seizure
of most home raid victims is unconstitutional.
The Court in Florida v. Royer held that any consent to being searched
which is the product of an illegal seizure is not valid consent.277 While it is
possible to give consent voluntarily while being seized,278 that seizure must
be lawful. In the context of home raids, residents' responses to ICE
agents' demands for identification and immigration status are not
Respondent's Support Memo, In re M-, supra note 52, at 4.
272. See, e.g., In re O-R-, at 4 (Immigr. Ct., Elizabeth, N.J. May 1, 2008) (on file with
author); Aguilar Complaint, supra note 20, 120-21.
273. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968).
274. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
275. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
276. Transcript of Record, In re O-R-, supra note 50, at 107 (testimony of ICE Officer
Belluardo).
277. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983).
278. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,424-25 (1976).
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
[Vol. 33:561
THE ICE STORM IN U.S. HOMES
voluntary if their seizure is unlawful, which it typically is. As a result, ICE
agents are using unconstitutionally-obtained statements as the basis for
their arrests.
C. Weaknesses in the Fourth Amendment Doctrine Should Not Be
the Basis for Public Policy
Home raids appear to involve rampant constitutional violations, but
the Court's application of its own tests and standards reveals several
possible hurdles for plaintiffs seeking to prevail in these constitutional
claims. This section examines these doctrinal idiosyncrasies. While
adjudicating each Fourth Amendment issue separately might allow ICE's
practices to stand, most people would agree that the total experience is
extremely intrusive. This section concludes that ICE's practices in home
raids flout the principles of the Fourth Amendment and that the potential
obstacles that could defeat constitutional claims provide a poor foundation
for public policy.
1. Weaknesses in the Fourth Amendment Doctrine Could Allow ICE's
Practices to Survive Constitutional Challenges
With respect to consent searches, a totality of the circumstances test
means that there is little guidance or precedential effect from past
decisions. Even if a court were to find that ICE had not obtained
voluntary consent to enter a home in one case, the ruling could have little
consequence for other raids. Additionally, the bar for finding coercion is
high,279 and the use of deceptive tactics, or lies, is only one factor to
consider in assessing voluntariness."' 0
Challenges to ICE's practice of conducting "protective sweeps" face
the problem that the Supreme Court and lower courts tend to allow
privacy intrusions in order to protect officer safety. In Terry v. Ohio, the
Court began balancing competing interests rather than applying
categorical requirements, determining the reasonableness of the search
279. Supreme Court cases holding that a confession was involuntary have involved a
variety of factors, including refusal of requests to speak with a lawyer and deceptive use of
the suspect's friend to elicit a confession, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959);
threats to allow an angry mob into the jail, Payne v. Arkansas, 536 U.S. 560, 567 (1958);
forcing the suspect to remain naked in jail, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405-07
(1945); over thirty-six hours of questioning, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54
(1944); and physical abuse, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Court found
consent to accompany drug enforcement officers was voluntary despite the defendant's
limited education, lack of knowledge of the right to refuse, and the likelihood of a young
African-American woman feeling threatened by the white male officers. United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980). The doctrine on voluntariness of consent is based
largely on the Court's cases assessing the voluntariness of a confession. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1973).
280. See generally Spano, 360 U.S. at 323.
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based on the level of intrusion and the interests of the state, such as officer
safety. 81 The Court allowed intrusions in various forms in subsequent
cases also based on the need to protect officer safety.282 While these cases
cabin the scope of a warrantless search far beyond what occurs in a typical
home raid, courts may nonetheless be reluctant to strike down a practice
where the same state interest is at stake.
There are two main features of the doctrine on seizures that could
complicate claims that the immigration-related information residents
provide is coerced. 23  First, residents' claims that a reasonable person
would not have felt free to decline the officers' requests in a home raid
face a doctrine that finds consent in situations in which it is difficult to
281. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). This case marked a significant departure
from the Court's previous holdings that the Fourth Amendment categorically required
probable cause and a warrant (or a specified exception) for searches.
282. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (allowing a protective sweep of
areas where a person could hide that are immediately adjacent to the individual arrested
without reasonable suspicion and of the remaining areas of the home with reasonable
suspicion that others are present and represent a danger); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (allowing a protective sweep of the passenger compartment of the car of a person
legally stopped if the officer reasonably believes the person stopped is dangerous); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (allowing a full search of the passenger compartment of
the car upon an arrest without any suspicion of danger), abrogated in part by Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (limiting a search of the passenger compartment of a car
upon an arrest to situations in which "the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest"); Chimel v California, 395 U.S. 751 (1969)
(allowing a search of the area within grabbing reach of the person arrested).
283. There are several statutory barriers to prevailing in unlawful seizure claims. First,
at least twenty states have statutes that require individuals to identify themselves when
asked by police officers in the course of a Terry stop, overriding an individual's right to
decline this request. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humbolt County, 542
U.S. 177, 182 (2004). These statutes have been upheld as a reasonable intrusion of privacy
in light of the government's interest in law enforcement. Id. at 187-88. However, these
statutes do not require the individual to provide proof of identity and may not bind
individuals confronted by immigration officials. In Hiibel, the Court followed the balancing
approach established in Terry and decided that requiring a person to state her identity was
justified by the law enforcement interests at stake. Id at 188. The state interest in
enforcing administrative law may not be as great as in enforcing criminal law. Also,
enforcement of "stop and identify" statutes in immigration enforcement may conflict with
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, since one's identification often
provides proof of immigration status and many immigration violations are also crimes. See,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2006) (failure to carry registration); 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2006)
(willful failure to register); 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (improper entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1326
(2006) (reentry by a previously deported noncitizen).
Former Secretary Chertoff and Assistant Secretary Myers cited another statutory
barrier: federal law makes it a misdemeanor for noncitizens over the age of eighteen not to
carry proof of alien registration at all times. § 1304(e). See Chertoff Letter, supra note 37;
Myers Letter, supra note 50. This statute provides additional support for ICE agents' right
to request identification, but the Fourth Amendment requires agents to have reasonable
suspicion that the person is an alien and is not carrying proof of registration to compel
compliance. See Terry, 395 U.S. at 20.
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imagine a person feeling free to decline the request in reality. Few people
feel free to terminate an encounter with police, especially if they do not
know they have the right to do so. The Court has acknowledged this, but
has also indicated that responses will be presumed consensual unless there
are other coercive factors present. INS v. Delgado presents a particular
challenge because it involved an immigration raid on a factory. INS agents
stationed themselves at the exits of the factory while other agents asked
everyone inside for proof of authorization to work. 5 The Court found
that Workers were free to move about the factory and that the presence of
officers at the exits was insufficient to support a reasonable belief that the
workers were not free to refuse to answer questions and leave. 86 Instead,
the Court found that workers who did not feel free to leave felt this way
because they did not want to lose their employment, not because of the
agents' conduct. 87
Second, in assessing whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to
stop and question an individual, courts defer to the expertise of the
officers,288 allow for reasonable mistakes of fact on the part of officers,289
and look at the totality of the circumstances such that individual facts,
innocent on their own, can be sufficient in combination to justify
reasonable suspicion.29 Courts have found reasonable suspicion existed
when an individual ran after seeing police cars in a high crime area,291 and
when a car and its occupants fit a general description and were found in
the immediate vicinity of the site of the crime.292 Additionally, although
284. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). The fact that seizure cases often
involve individuals with illegal material in their bags agreeing to officers' requests to search
their same bags indicates that these individuals did not feel free to decline; nonetheless, the
Court requires more. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding that
a reasonable person would still feel free to decline officers' request to search his bags and
person in a bus sweep in which one officer was stationed at the front of the bus, another at
the back, and a third was questioning all of the passengers); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991) (remanding for additional fact finding and holding that a reasonable person could
feel free to decline the officer's request to search his bag in a bus sweep by two armed
officers).
285. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 209-10.
286. Id. at 218.
287. Id.
288. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("A trained officer draws
inferences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.").
289. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) ("Sufficient probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the
record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable
response to the situation facing them at the time.").
290. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) ("Any one of these factors is
not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But
we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.").
291. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
292. United States v. Danielson, 728 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1984).
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race or ethnicity alone cannot be the basis for reasonable suspicion, they
can be taken into account to support reasonable suspicion.29 3 In home
raids, therefore, if ICE's target is present and cannot prove lawful status,
and the other residents are of the same race and appear to be family
members, agents may have reasonable suspicion to detain the potential
family members, since immigration status is often tied to family
relationships. Similarly, ICE agents might have reasonable suspicion to
seize and question all the residents of a single home who are of the same
race, gender, and approximate age as their intended target, assuming the
agents can point to specific facts that support their belief that the target
resides in the home.
2. Doctrinal Idiosyncrasies Do Not Justify the Highly Violative Practice
of Home Raids
There are strong arguments that ICE's practices in home raids
regularly violate the Constitution in numerous ways, and many would
agree that home raids involve extremely intrusive actions by the state.
Yet, by parsing out each stage of a typical home raid-entry into the home,
searching all rooms for individuals, collecting and questioning all
individuals-it is also possible to see that what appear to be violations
might be deemed constitutional. Nonetheless, the existence of possible
obstacles to constitutional claims does not justify ICE's current practice.
Official policy should conform to the foundational principle of the Fourth
Amendment: protecting individuals' privacy.
Consent based on deception is not typically considered voluntary. The
only reason for ICE agents to call themselves police or say they have a
warrant is to encourage residents to draw the wrong conclusions regarding
the agents' authority, since few people would consent to immigration
agents entering their homes. Similarly, justifying searches based on safety
and then arresting most of the individuals found in the home uses an
exception to the Fourth Amendment to swallow the rule itself. Finally,
characterizing responses to agents' questions as "voluntary," after
residents have been pulled out of bed and held in a room while agents
block the exits, defies belief.
When taken as a whole, ICE's current practice seems intuitively
wrong. The fact that the practice might be upheld as constitutional reflects
limitations in the doctrine, not a justification for public policy. The final
section of this article builds on the constitutional arguments to abandon
the current policy and examines the broader social costs of home raids in
their current form. It concludes with proposals for policymakers in the
Obama Administration.
293. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,886-87 (1975).
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III.
THE NEED FOR POLICY REFORM
UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
Civil lawsuits and suppression motions challenging ICE's current
practice may be of limited value in effecting immediate policy change. It
could take years for precedential decisions to emerge at the circuit level
and even longer to resolve any splits. In addition, assessments of consent,
seizure, and reasonable suspicion are heavily fact dependent, as discussed
above. A factual scenario resulting in damages or suppression in one case
may not provoke policy change, since ICE could prevail in the next case
with a different set of facts. As a result, policy change must be made by
the political branches. This can be accomplished most easily and
effectively by the Executive, but Congress could also drive change by
eliminating funds for enforcement via home raids or passing statutes that
prohibit problematic practices.
The mounting social costs of home raids, along with their
unconstitutional tactics, militate for a change in public policy. The new
administration should abandon the practice of enforcement in private
homes and focus on other established avenues to enforce immigration law.
If the administration decides to continue an enforcement policy that
includes residential initiatives, it should take steps to ensure that the
constitutional rights of occupants are protected; that their lack of
familiarity with their rights in the United States is not exploited; and that
ICE agents are focused on priority targets, not dragnet sweeps.
A. The Social Cost of Home Raids Provides Additional Support for
Policy Change
The broader costs of home raids have been documented in many
areas. Perhaps their most direct impact is on the relationship between
local law enforcement offices and immigrant communities."' This
relationship is affected by ICE's current practice in home raids of calling
themselves police or using police officers to try to obtain "consent" for
immigration officials to enter the home. The Nassau County Police
Commissioner summed up this concern in his statement that "Nassau has
the lowest crime rate in the nation for a county of its size, in part because
294. This concern is frequently discussed in the context of agreements known as
"287g's" between local law enforcement and ICE, which allow local police forces to enforce
federal immigration law, but there need not be a formal agreement for the relationship
between immigrant communities and local police forces to be affected by federal
enforcement practices. See, e.g., Major Cities Chiefs Association, Letter Announcing
Recommendations for U.S. Congress and President Regarding the Immigration Crisis
(June 7, 2006), http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org/pdfpublic/mcc-press-release-june_2006.
pdf (stating that local police should not enforce federal immigration laws).
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the police have good cooperation from the community. The conduct of the
raids could undermine that relationship. 29 5 Many cities have developed
policies prohibiting local police officers from asking about immigration
status in order to encourage immigrant communities to report crimes and
cooperate in investigations.296 When these police officers are asked by
immigration agents to assist in carrying out home raids, they are placed in
the difficult position of being asked to support enforcement of federal laws
that they are prohibited from enforcing through their own policing
activities.297 Ultimately, raids are likely to undermine local efforts to fight
crime through community policing.
Concerns have also been raised about extended detentions and even
wrongful deportation of U.S. citizens as a result of raids.29 Some U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents are being asked to bear the burden
of an overbroad immigration enforcement practice that includes
constitutionally-questionable tactics.299 The New Jersey lawsuit describes
the experience of the Chavez family, lawful permanent resident parents
with a U.S. citizen child.3"' They reported that ICE officers arrived at their
home in six unmarked cars at approximately 7:15 a.m. one morning.3"1 Mr.
Chavez was outside when the agents pushed him up to his door and told
him that if he didn't open the door, they were going to make things
worse.3"2 When Mr. Chavez opened the door, seven agents ran inside.30 3
At one point, an agent pointed his gun at Mrs. Chavez and her nine-year-
old son and said, "Where are the illegal people? '3 °4 After showing the
agents proof of everyone's lawful status, the family reported that one agent
295. Bernstein, supra note 82. Similarly, a police lieutenant in Richmond, California,
stated: "We at the Richmond Police Department have heard that the ICE operations that
targeted illegal residents have caused a lot of mistrust of all law enforcement." Lochner,
supra note 192.
296. See, e.g., City of New York, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003); S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12.H.2 (2000); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 27-9-1 (Supp. 2009);
Mandell, supra note 99.
297. See, e.g., Mandell, supra note 99. See also Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Bay
Area Reacts Angrily to Series of Immigration Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A14.
298. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Immigration Is Snaring U.S. Citizens in Its Raids, WASH.
POST, Aug. 16, 2008, at A3; Eunice Moscoso, Immigration Raids May Nab U.S. Citizens.
Ga. Teen Says Was Targeted Based on Looks, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 14, 2008, at 6A;
Marisa Taylor, Feds Admit Jailing Citizens as Illegal Immigrants, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb.
14, 2008, at A8.
299. See e.g., Bernstein, supra note 82 ("'That is not uncommon,' [Peter Smith, ICE's
special agent in charge of the raids] said of the citizen's mistaken arrest as a deportable
immigrant.").




304. Id. T 82, 85.
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said that they would be back and "next time it would be worse."3"5
A congressional subcommittee on immigration held hearings that
addressed the impact of raids on U.S. citizens in April 2008. The lead
plaintiff in the Georgia class action, Marie Mancha, is a U.S citizen and
was in tenth grade at the time of the raid. She testified before Congress
regarding her experience during the raid on her home.3"6 In her legal
complaint, Ms. Mancha said she was getting ready for school alone in the
house while her mother was running an errand.3 7 Ms. Mancha reported
hearing car doors slam in front of her home and unlocking her front door
but leaving it closed, thinking her mother had just returned from the
errand.0 8 She stated that she then heard voices from inside her home
shouting, "Police! Illegals!" and that when she went downstairs, she
reportedly found five ICE agents blocking the door and saw a total of
twenty to twenty-five agents in or around her home.3" Several agents
asked Ms. Mancha if her mother had worked at a nearby pultry plant and
about her mother's immigration status. Ms. Mancha told the agents that
her mother was born in Florida and was a citizen.31 ° She asked the agents
why they were in her home, and one responded that they were looking for
"illegals." ' Ms. Mancha reported hearing one agent say to another that
they would go to a nearby gas station where they would find a lot of
Mexicans.312 Representative Zoe Lofgren criticized ICE's procedures in
raids, stating that she feared we have arrived in an era "where an
overzealous government is interrogating, detaining, and deporting its own
citizens while treating non-citizens even worse.,
313
Citizens and lawful residents who "appear foreign" -often of Hispanic
descent-are those most likely to be swept up in raids; the result is that the
burden of the current policy is disproportionately allocated on the basis of
race. Santa Fe, New Mexico, Mayor David Cross denounced raids in the
area as "hurtful, hateful and divisive" and directed the city attorney's
office to investigate reports of civil rights violations and file complaints
with DHS.314 Two white plaintiffs in the case arising out of the raids in
Willmar, Minnesota, stated that they were not corralled in a central
305. Id. 1 88,91.
306. Fears, supra note 298.
307. Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, at 24.
308. Id. 125.
309. Id. 26-28.
310. Id. J 10.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Moscoso, supra note 298.
314. Week in Review February 25-March 3, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Mar. 4, 2007, at
C4.
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location or questioned like all of the Latino residents of the home.315 The
large numbers of individuals arrested who do not fit any of the official
priority categories for Fugitive Operations Teams and the existence of
policies and practices that seem intended to generate a large numbers of
collateral arrests have led to claims that home raids reflect a policy of
racial profiling in the selection of houses and questioning of residents, and,
therefore, that they violate the Equal Protection Clause and civil rights
laws.316
There is also a more subtle racial aspect present in raids. In a lawful
search, law enforcement officers can seize evidence of criminal activity if it
is in plain view, even if the object is not covered by a warrant, so long as
there is probable cause that the object is evidence of a crime. Discussing
the practice of making collateral arrests, former Assistant Secretary Myers
stated that "ICE cannot turn a blind eye to illegal aliens once
encountered." '317 This statement implies that when officers search a home,
they are treating residents the way contraband is treated under the plain
view doctrine. Instead of being individuals in their homes with privacy
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, home raid victims are
evidentiary objects demonstrating unlawful activity. This attitude
degrades immigrants and treats them as less worthy of the constitutional
provisions intended to protect individuals' dignity. It is also important to
note that race is not an accurate indicator of illegality. ICE officers only
know someone is without legal status after a series of Fourth Amendment
violations reveal that fact.
More fundamentally, the raids erode the sense that the U.S.
government abides by the rule of law and protects everyone equally. In an
interview with the ABA Journal, Michael Neifach, ICE's principal legal
adviser, discussed the numerous legal challenges brought against ICE
related to raids.318 Pointing to the limitations on the exclusionary rule in
immigration proceedings established in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, he stated
that "even if agents didn't have the residents' approval [to enter their
homes], such searches and any subsequent arrests may not be disqualified
in immigration courts." He added: "Aliens and citizens are protected by
the Constitution, but the protections are different." '319 Mr. Neifach's
statement implies that ICE may be taking advantage of the fact that
noncitizens have few remedies available for constitutional violations. This
315. Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 91-92.
316. Arias Complaint, supra note 51, 125-30; Argueta Complaint, supra note 2,
253-60; Mancha Complaint, supra note 51, $I 96-98; Flores-Morales Complaint, supra note
51, 55(g).
317. Myers Letter, supra note 50.
318. Stephanie Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on ICE: Tougher Immigration
Enforcement Tactics Spur Challenges, 94 A.B.A. J. 44 (2008).
319. Id.
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implication was made explicit by Professor Jan Ting from Temple
University's Beasley School of Law: "It is well-established in immigration
law that you can do a lot of stuff you couldn't if it were concerning
American citizens. If the exclusionary rule does not apply, is there
anything wrong about law enforcement going in and getting the people
they're looking for?, 320 In other words, it is fine for the government to
enter homes and arrest individuals in a way that is unconstitutional
because there is no penalty for this behavior.
This attitude is troubling to say the least. The government should not
be testing the line of what is permissible by intruding into a private home
and seizing of all of its occupants. An individual has an interest in pushing
the bounds of the law in order to have more space to act free from
government interference. 32' The state's interest is only the aggressive
enforcement of administrative law, which is insufficient to justify the
government's practice of pushing, if not crossing, the limits of the
Constitution.322 Instead, the government should ensure that its actions
conform to the law.323 The absence of effective constraints on ICE's
practices in the form of the exclusionary rule does not change the analysis.
ICE's current policy in home raids erodes the government's credibility
because it disrespects constitutional rights the Executive is charged to
protect.
The editorial board of the New York Times discussed the question of
why ICE's current practice is wrong, regardless of the legal consequences,
in an editorial on the "war on illegal immigration." It wrote: "The true
cost is to the national identity: the sense of who we are and what we value.
It will hit us once the enforcement fever breaks, when we look at what has
been done and no longer recognize the country that did it.' '324  A
government policy requiring federal agents, without warrants, to force or
manipulate their way into private homes, to search the premises, and to
interrogate residents does not respect the country's founding principles of
individual liberty and protection from the coercive power of the state.
B. Proposals for Policy Change Under the Obama Administration
The above discussion illustrates the immense costs of home raids to
the integrity of the Constitution and the values of our society. The most
320. Id.
321. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 15, 18-19 (2006) (arguing that "the government does not have an interest in
being unconstrained by law, in the way that the individual does," but instead, "the
government should in all things act in accordance with law").
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Editorial, The Great Immigration Panic, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A22.
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appropriate policy response is to stop conducting home raids altogether.
The INS once had a policy against investigations at homes because the
Department of Justice had concluded that "private dwellings must be
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. '" 325  ICE
should return to this policy. While these raids result in arrests of
individuals without lawful status, their lack of status is only discovered
after a series of privacy invasions and mistreatment by federal officials.
The aggressive state action and ensuing degradation of victims is not
justified by the routine enforcement of administrative law, especially when
one takes into account that nearly half of all arrests are of individuals with
no criminal history who do not represent a danger to society.
Immigration law can be enforced at the borders, through applications
for immigration benefits, and through employers where the privacy
interests at stake are not as great and where there are better structures in
place to assure that a person's constitutional rights are protected. It is
doubtful that home raids would produce any results if ICE abandoned its
manipulative tactics for gaining entry and its practice of searching homes
and seizing their occupants. Residents would likely deny entry or refuse to
produce identification. The new administration should put an end to a
policy that depends on constitutionally-suspect tactics in order to be
effective.
If the Obama Administration does continue immigration enforcement
at private residences, it should put in place safeguards to prevent ICE
agents from exploiting residents' lack of knowledge about their
constitutional rights. First, ICE agents should be required to identify
themselves and inform a home's occupants of their right to refuse entry.326
The individuals who receive requests to enter often have no familiarity
with the U.S. legal system and their rights; they may come from countries
where there is no right to refuse a request by law enforcement; they may or
may not understand the language spoken by ICE agents; and they often
believe the agents are police officers. These individuals are vulnerable to
deceptive tactics. Instead of taking advantage of this, ICE officers should
take extra precautions to ensure that consent to enter is truly voluntary.
In the absence of consent, ICE agents should be required to have a
judicially-authorized arrest warrant. A modified warrant requirement
would follow the Camara Court's holding with respect to administrative
home searches.327 ICE agents could use a prior order of deportation or an
325. Authority of I.N.S. Officers to Assist State Enforcement Operations, 8 Op. INS
Gen. Counsel 91-36 (1991).
326. Such a requirement is not without precedent. For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the government must show knowledge of the right of refusal for
consent to be valid under the State Constitution's guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975).
327. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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order to appear at a Detention and Removal Office to show grounds to
arrest an individual, but agents should also have to show facts that support
probable cause that the individual resides in the home they want to enter.
This is similar to the requirement for a search warrant to arrest an
individual on criminal charges in the home of a third party.328 An arrest
warrant would authorize agents to search the home only to the extent
necessary to find the individual named in the warrant and conduct a
protective sweep as confined by Buie.31
9
The warrant should not give ICE agents authority to search the home
generally or seize its occupants. 3" Agents typically have no legitimate
basis to believe that the home's other occupants are in violation of
immigration laws before they enter a home and question the residents. An
ex-ante showing is a key part of the protection afforded by the warrant
requirement. 33' The combination of requiring ICE officers to inform
individuals of their right to refuse entry and to possess a judicial arrest
warrant for entry in the absence of consent would reflect a better balance
between the privacy rights of individuals in their own homes and the need
to enforce immigration laws. These requirements would also mitigate the
problem of ICE targeting homes based on outdated and inaccurate
information.
Additionally, the new administration should closely monitor the effect
of its shift from arrest quotas to quotas for targeting and identifying
"fugitive aliens" to ensure that these quotas do not continue to incentivize
dragnet sweeps. The new administration should make certain that
enforcement activities and metrics focus on those individuals with recent,
legitimate removal orders who represent a real risk of danger, not
individuals with no criminal record who happen to be associated with the
address of a noncitizen who may or may not know that she received a
removal order at some point in the past.
At a minimum, ICE should enforce its own regulations 332 and
guidelines333 when conducting home raids. This would put an end to ICE
328. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
329. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
330. See Marisa Anton-Fallon, The Fourth Amendment and Immigration
Enforcement in the Home: Can ICE Target the Utmost Sphere of Privacy?, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 999, 1029 (2008) (arguing that a judicially-authorized search warrant should be
required to provide legal authorization for ICE's current practice). Note that this proposal
would provide a legal basis for the current practice rather than change it. Also, because
search warrants must specify the evidence to be sought, the use of a search warrant would
mean that "illegal immigrants" constituted the evidence to be found.
331. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (holding that a neutral
and detached magistrate must determine that probable cause exists before issuing a
warrant).
332. 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.8(b)(1)-(2), (f)(2) (2009).
333. GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 137.
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agents forcibly entering homes or entering without permission when a
resident merely opens the door. ICE agents would also have to refrain
from using force or intimidation to corral residents or to compel
compliance with requests for identification and immigration status
information. Without knowledge of their right to refuse requests,
residents might still believe that they must allow ICE agents to enter their
home and answer their questions, but this is a problem with the Fourth
Amendment doctrine that pervades criminal investigations as well. While
only a partial solution, at least residents would be protected from the most
violative behavior currently typical in home raids.
Congress can also change the current policy through attaching
conditions to the monies it appropriates to ICE's Fugitive Operations
Teams. The budget for this program has grown from $9 million in 2003, its
first year of operation, to more than $218 million in fiscal year 2008."'4
ICE has sold this program and its budget increases to Congress by
emphasizing the program's focus on arresting noncitizens with criminal
convictions.335 However, the number of collateral arrests generated by the
program was not revealed until February 2009.336 Congress can make the
agency's receipt of additional funds contingent upon a change in its
enforcement methods and priorities.
CONCLUSION
Accounts of how home raids are typically carried out and how
individuals are treated by U.S. officials are surprising and disturbing. The
current practice has understandably generated innumerable legal
challenges and raises significant Fourth Amendment questions.
ICE may claim that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to people
present in the United States unlawfully, but precedent and the agency's
own policy in the past indicate the opposite. ICE's practice in home raids
defies the principles of the Fourth Amendment. To gain entry to homes,
ICE agents force their way inside or deceive residents regarding their
identity and purpose. This practice stretches any definition of "consent."
Once inside, agents search the home for other occupants without a basis to
believe those other occupants are dangerous and often before making any
arrests. ICE mischaracterizes these searches as "protective sweeps" when,
in reality, the searches bear little resemblance to that sanctioned practice.
After locating all of the home's residents, agents order them to a central
location and request identification, at times with their guns out or using the
334. See MENDELSON, STROM & WISHNIE, supra note 42, at 1.
335. Nina Bernstein, Despite Vow, Target of Immigrant Raids Shifted, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2009, at Al.
336. Id.
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threat of arrest. Residents are not consenting to questioning, they are
simply doing what they are told to do after being seized. Yet agents admit
that corralling residents is standard practice and not based on
individualized suspicion that each and every resident is violating
immigration law.
While it is possible that certain features of the Fourth Amendment
doctrine could allow ICE to survive a constitutional challenge, and also
that the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is limited in
immigration proceedings, the number and nature of the claims provide
strong support for policy change. ICE pushes the floor on what is
constitutional and takes advantage of the lack of legal consequences when
it goes too far. When the strength of the constitutional claims are
combined with the social costs of the raids, the case for policy change is
overwhelming.
There are several ways the current policy could be rectified. The most
complete and effective method would be to stop home raids altogether. At
a minimum, ICE should be forced to follow its own regulations. Whatever
choice the new administration makes, one thing is clear: the Obama
Administration must put an end to a policy that denigrates individuals,
immigrant communities, and the Constitution. The costs are simply too
high.
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